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PATENT EXHAUSTION: WHAT'S IT GOOD FOR?*
Vincent Chiappetta**
The Supreme Court created the patent' exhaustion2
* With apologies to Norman Whitfield, Barrett Strong and, of course,
Edwin Starr.
** Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. My thanks to
the Santa Clara School of Law High Technology Institute for putting together a
terrific symposium, and particularly, my thanks to Professor Eric Goldman for
inviting me to participate.
1. The inquiry here is limited to domestic patent exhaustion. The
exhaustion doctrine also applies to other intellectual property regimes.
Although a discussion of patent exhaustion can inform those other applications,
significant differences in doctrine and policy across regimes precludes a one-
size-fits-all solution. For example, copyright exhaustion is governed by § 109 of
the Copyright Act (15 U.S.C. § 109), and must consider that statutory language
and legislative history. Additionally, unlike patent law, copyright must address
the significant free speech issues that arise from giving authors control over
expression. Cf Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree:
The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21
MICH. J. INT'L. L. 333, 361-66 (discussing the point in the context of
international exhaustion). International, inter-jurisdictional exhaustion raises
yet more complex doctrinal, policy, and political issues that also require
separate inquiry and analysis. See generally id.
2. "Patent exhaustion" and the "first sale doctrine" refer to the same
substantive rule: the inability to claim patent infringement based on post-sale
use or resale following the initial authorized sale of a patented article. Further
confusing matters, the doctrine is also referred to as "first sale exhaustion" and
is sometimes conflated with the notion of "implied license." See infra note 162.
There are three arguments made for preferring the "first sale" nomenclature
over "exhaustion." The first is largely semantic, that as a patent only gives the
owner a negative right to exclude, it is technically inaccurate to talk in terms of
the patent as having been "used up." See, e.g., Judge Giles S. Rich, Address at
Sixth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & Policy
(April 16, 1998). The second argument focuses on the important substantive
point that the doctrine does not actually "exhaust" the owner's entire patent
right; it merely prevents post-sale patent enforcement based on use or resale of
a specific article following its "first sale." See infra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text. The final argument objects that "exhaustion" may prejudge
the doctrine's application. Specifically, the "first sale" tie to a specific
transaction leaves room for the parties to override its application based on the
particular circumstances, whereas "exhaustion" suggests an "immutable state of
affairs." See F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals
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doctrine in the nineteenth century.' It arose from the
straight-forward proposition that patent owners should only
be paid once when they sell an article incorporating their
invention.' Upon payment of the purchase price, the patent
owner receives its full due, and the rest of us should be free
thereafter to use and resell the article without further
concern for the patent.s
Economic life, however, is not straight-forward. During
the twentieth century, the market matured and patent
exploitation became more complex. The factual permutations
and the Court's exhaustion decisions proliferated, ultimately
leaving the exhaustion doctrine in some disarray.'
Many hoped the Court's most recent consideration of the
doctrine in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.'
would provide the needed clarification. Instead, the decision
produced yet more confusion. The opinion largely ignored the
debate, and instead offered Delphic pronouncements leading
to conflicting interpretations by commentators.8 Some read
by Taking Contracting Options off the Table?, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315,
321-22 (2008). The use of "patent exhaustion" in the article merely reflects my
personal view that "exhaustion" better distinguishes the patent doctrine from
statutory copyright first sale and is more consistent with international usage.
It is not a position on the merits; regarding which I argue that the doctrine
should come down in favor of the default view.
3. The origins of the doctrine generally are traced back to Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852), although the Court does cite in that opinion to
the earlier case of Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646 (1846). Unlike the copyright
first sale doctrine, patent exhaustion has never been codified in the federal
Patent Act.
4. The "single royalty" rationale is discussed infra at notes 24-25 and
accompanying text (discussing the rationale's articulation in the Adams case).
5. Without exhaustion, every patented article would carry the risk of
infringement. Patent law's "in rem" rights reach everyone using and selling
such articles without the need for a specific undertaking (privity), no matter
how far removed the user or seller may be from the original sale and even if
they are unaware the patent exists. The regime's powerful "property rules"
remedial bias favors injunctive relief, preventing further use or resale even by
the article's owner, and damages that deter as well as compensate.
6. The myriad cases populating the doctrine's troubled past are discussed
infra in Part I.
7. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). The decision is discussed infra at notes 123-50 and
accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive
Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. AM. L.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=1540527; Thomas
G. Hungar, Observations Regarding the Supreme Court's Decision in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 49 IDEA 517 (2008-2009); Kieff, supra
note 2; Jason McCammon, The Validity of Conditional Sales: Competing views
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the case as holding the doctrine absolutely prohibits patent
enforcement of post-sale conditions. Others view the decision
as a cautionary tale, with exhaustion operating as a default
contract term placing the burden on patent owners (and their
lawyers) to incorporate any waiver explicitly into the sale
agreement. Many practitioners and scholars, myself
included, are not sure what the correct interpretation may be.
Two inquiries help untangle the situation. Part I
examines the Court's exhaustion jurisprudence, identifying
the specific source and nature of the confusion. That inquiry
reveals three uncontroversial principles directing the
doctrine's basic application. First, patent exhaustion only
applies when the patent owner has authorized the making
and sale of the particular article in question.9 Specifically,
when otherwise legal conditions limit a licensee's
manufacture and sale, the doctrine does not apply to articles
made or distributed beyond the scope of those restrictions. In
such cases, the patent can be enforced against both the
licensee and anyone acquiring, using, or reselling such
articles, even a purchaser for full value. Second, when the
sale of an authorized article does not include otherwise lawful
post-sale restrictions, exhaustion prohibits the claim that
subsequent use or resale constitutes patent infringement."o
Finally, when it applies, exhaustion only permits use and
resale of the article sold." Exhaustion does not authorize
either the making or sale of additional articles, nor does it
permit the reconstruction of an authorized article at the end
of its useful life.
The confusion arises when the sale of an authorized
article purports to impose otherwise lawful limitations on its
use or resale. The Court's exhaustion cases fail to clearly
resolve the basic issue: Is patent exhaustion mandatory, or is
it merely a default the parties can waive by contrary
agreement? If it is mandatory, the doctrine prevents any
patent enforcement of post-sale restrictions, even when the
sale transaction is expressly to the contrary. If it is a default,
then proper waiver will permit patent enforcement of post-
of Patent Exhaustion in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 785 (2009).
9. See infra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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sale limitations on use or resale against not only the original
purchaser, but also all subsequent owners or users violating
the restrictions. This unresolved issue raises a follow-on
question: When patent exhaustion applies, does it only
prevent the patent infringement claim or does it also prevent
enforcement under contract law?
Part II addresses the latter two questions by first
assessing which response best advances the market efficiency
paradigm that currently justifies and drives the patent
regime. That inquiry finds strong support for exhaustion as a
legal default provision, filling the "gap" when the parties have
been silent concerning the seller/patent owner's right to post-
sale patent enforcement. 12 Transactional terms implied by
law reduce transaction costs when they provide outcomes
consistent with what reasonable parties would normally
agree to under the circumstances. When the parties have not
addressed post-sale patent rights, it can be reasonably
assumed they intend that, upon payment of the agreed
consideration, the buyer will receive the article free of any
limitations on post-sale use or resale imposed by the patent.
That legitimate expectation, combined with the significant
consequences of post-sale patent enforcement, also supports
imposing a high threshold for effective waiver of the default.
Patent owners wishing to preserve their post-sale patent
rights should be required to explicitly articulate the exact
scope and terms of the proposed waiver by tying it to specific
restrictions, to obtain the buyer's express assent, and to
ensure its explicit implementation in the final agreement.
Finally, the default approach resolves the open question of
how exhaustion should affect contract enforcement in favor of
independent assessment. Exhaustion is governed by the
waiver requirements and contract enforcement is governed
exclusively by normal principles of contract law.
Market efficiency does not support a mandatory (per se)
exhaustion rule prohibiting all patent enforcement of
restrictions, even when the parties have properly waived the
doctrine's application. Post-sale patent enforcement does
raise a number of legitimate efficient market "assumption"
concerns.' 3  The regime's in rem application increases
12. See infra notes 156-71 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (discussing the
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transaction costs by requiring downstream acquirers and
users to determine if such a right exists. The increased
availability of injunctive enforcement can prevent resources
from moving to their maximum use, can cause waste from
disposal of tangible articles prior to the end of their useful
life, can impair competition, and may impede innovation.
Justifying exhaustion, however, requires more than
identifying that these costs exist. An appropriate resolution
must also consider the beneficial transactional flexibility and
increased patent incentives that post-sale patent enforcement
can produce. Obtaining a net positive outcome requires
eschewing a blanket exhaustion prohibition in favor of
targeted solutions that address the specific cost concerns-for
example, reducing downstream transaction costs by making
actual or inquiry notice a condition precedent to patent
enforcement and, perhaps, recalibrating environmental,
antitrust, and other general law requirements to address any
significant waste, competition, or innovation concerns that
may arise.
The final efficiency argument, that per se exhaustion acts
as an internal patent law constraint ensuring that the
regime's powerful exclusionary rights produce optimal
incentives, is equally unconvincing.14 That argument
requires demonstrating that limiting enforcement of post-sale
restrictions to contract law in all circumstances produces a
more efficient outcome than the default approach. As patent
enforcement permits greater transactional flexibility and
higher returns, thus enhancing the regime's incentives to
innovate, the answer turns on whether the consumer welfare
gains from the contract-only approach exceed those losses. As
with most patent matters, there is insufficient empirical data
to make a definitive determination. A review of the relevant
considerations, however, makes it very likely that a per se
exhaustion rule would actually reduce rather than enhance
efficient market operation.
Merely determining that market efficiency does not
support per se exhaustion does not conclude the inquiry. It
can be argued that the doctrine's justification lies in its
assumptions necessary for efficient market operation and their relationship to
post-sale patent enforcement). See infra notes 172-220 (discussing the
efficiency assumption justifications applied to per se exhaustion).
14. See infra notes 221-42 and accompanying text.
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mitigation of the adverse effects that an efficient patent law
regime has on individual members of society." Specifically,
the current regime's focus on producing optimal market
incentives to innovate imposes substantial limitations on
access to patented articles that are important and even
essential to personal well-being. Preventing patent law
enforcement of post-sale restrictions might increase the
availability of patented goods, thus reducing that problem.
Although patent law's distributional effects deserve
serious consideration, addressing that issue requires a
fundamental rethinking and restructuring of the regime, and
likely much more of the legal and social fabric. Although
mandatory exhaustion may play a useful role in
implementing a decision to adjust patent law's goals, the
doctrine's appropriateness cannot be assessed before the new
objectives have been determined. Any attempt to justify
exhaustion on non-efficiency grounds is, therefore, not only
premature, but more likely to confuse than advance the
necessary antecedent debate over the regime's appropriate
outcomes.
PART I: THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
The patent exhaustion doctrine is a creation of the
United States Supreme Court." Unlike the closely associated
copyright doctrine, it has never been codified in the federal
Patent Act." Examining the Court's precedents identifies
three (relatively) uncontroversial aspects of exhaustion that
define the doctrine's basic application, and reveals the two
open issues that create the confusion.
A. Exhaustion Basics
The doctrine's foundational principles are set out in the
much-cited Adams v. Burke."s The case involved a patent on
a coffin lid. The patent's original owner assigned Lockhart &
Seelye the limited right to make and sell the patented lids
15. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 3.
17. The Patent Act is codified at 35 U.S.C. §H 1-376 (2006).
18. 84 U.S. 453 (1873). The earlier, also frequently cited, case of Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852), involved a less direct application of the doctrine
as triggered by an extension of the patent term.
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within a ten-mile radius of the center of Boston.' 9 The
remaining rights were then transferred to Adams. 20 Lockhart
& Seelye made and sold a coffin lid within its assigned
territory to Burke, an undertaker who operated a funeral
business outside the ten-mile limitation.2' When Burke used
the lid in his business outside the Lockhart & Seelye
territory, Adams sued Burke for infringement.22
The Court made short work of dismissing Adams's patent
claim. It first held that "when [the lids] are once lawfully
made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be
implied for the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or
licensees."2 3 The Court then explained the rationale for
finding the patent rights had been exhausted by the Lockhart
& Seelye (first) sale as follows:
[I]n the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or
the person having his rights, sells a machine or
instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the
consideration for its use and he parts with the right to
restrict that use. The article . . . passes without the limit
of the monopoly. That is to say, the patentee or his
assignee having in the act of sale received all the royalty
or consideration which he claims for the use of his
invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is
open to the use of the purchaser without further
restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees. 24
These succinct statements in Adams establish the two
core exhaustion principles. First, when exhaustion applies to
the sale of an article, it precludes claims that the article's
post-sale use constitutes patent infringement. The effect,
however, goes beyond preventing the patent owner from
asserting the patent against the initial purchaser. Because
the article "passes without the limit of the monopoly," the
patent cannot be asserted against any subsequent owner
19. Adams, 84 U.S. at 453-54.
20. Id. at 454.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 457 (emphasis in original).
24. Id. at 456. In a footnote, the Court cited to Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55
U.S. 539 (1852), and Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544 (1872). Id. at 456 n.2. The
former case is frequently cited as the "original" exhaustion holding. See supra
note 3. The latter case is discussed infra at notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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based on use of the article.2 5 Second, the doctrine arises from
the "essential nature of things." When a patent owner sells a
patented article, reasonable parties will normally assume,
and so should the law, that the owner has demanded and
received full compensation under the patent. The sale,
therefore, should convey the article free of patent constraints
on its use. A contrary outcome would permit patent owners
to retain patent control and demand more than the single
royalty that is their due.
Following Adams, the Court developed a second line of
cases drawing an important distinction between authorized
and unauthorized sales. The distinction is best understood by
comparing the decisions in United States v. General Electric
Co." and General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric
Co., Inc. 27 with the holding in Adams. All three cases involve
a restriction on the manufacture and sale of the patented
articles. In Adams the rights were limited to making and
selling the patented coffin lids within a ten-mile radius of
Boston. In GE, Westinghouse had obtained a license to make
and sell General Electric's patented incandescent light bulbs
subject to its compliance with General Electric's pricing and
other sales policies." And in GTP, the patent owner granted
the licensee the right to make and sell patented amplifiers,
but only for private and home use.2 9
GE involved a United States Department of Justice
challenge to the resale price maintenance restriction under
antitrust law.30  Addressing how exhaustion affected the
matter, the Court first reiterated the Adams holding that
"where a patentee makes the patented article, and sells it, he
can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may
wish to do with the article after his purchase. It has passed
beyond the scope of the patentee's rights.""1 But the Court
then found Adams inapplicable on the facts, stating: "the
question is a different one which arises when we consider
25. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873) (quoting Bloomer, 55 U.S. at
549).
26. 272 U.S. 476 (1926) [hereinafter GE].
27. 304 U.S. 175 (1938), reh'g granted 305 U.S. 124 (1938) [hereinafter
GTP].
28. GE, 272 U.S. at 478-79.
29. GTP, 304 U.S. at 125-26.
30. GE, 272 U.S. at 478.
31. Id. at 489.
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what a patentee who grants a license to one to make and
vend the patented article may do in limiting the licensee in
the exercise of the right to sell."3 2 In such cases, the Court
held patent owners have the right to restrict licensees' rights
"upon any condition . . . which is reasonably within the
reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is
entitled to secure."3 3 The Court then went on to find the
resale price maintenance restriction consistent with that
requirement and, therefore, enforceable in accordance with
its terms.34
The GE case makes an important point about exhaustion.
The doctrine only affects post-sale restrictions on use and
resale of existing articles incorporating a patented invention.
Manufacturing licenses divide the patent right, permitting
the licensee to make new articles. The enforceability of
restrictions in such agreements raises different policy
concerns antecedent to the application of exhaustion.
In GTP, the Court fully closed the circle, defining how
manufacturing license restrictions affect exhaustion's
application to patented articles made and sold under a
limited license. 36  As in Adams, GTP involved a patent
owner's infringement suit against the purchaser of patented
articles made and sold by a licensee." Unlike in Adams,
however, the Court in GTP found the patent infringement
claim survived the sale.38
32. Id. at 489-90.
33. Id. at 489. The Court went on to define permissible conditions to be
those "normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the
patentee's monopoly." Id. at 490. The fact that a limiting condition can be
otherwise unenforceable has important implications for finding a justification
for exhaustion. Because some conditions will not be enforceable at all, including
under patent law, exhaustion only operates to prevent enforcement of otherwise
valid conditions.
34. Id. at 490-94.
35. The ability to leverage others' manufacturing capabilities requires a
different kind of control than leveraging third party distribution (resale)
expertise; specifically, it requires assurance that output levels can be
constrained. See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text. See also Bloomer
v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852).
36. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 304 U.S. 175 (1938),
reh'g granted 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
37. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 305 U.S. 124 (1938)
[hereinafter GTP Ill.
38. Id. at 127.
20111 1095
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The different outcome turned on the distinction made in
GE. In GTP, the licensee had sold the patented articles it
made for a commercial use, a clear violation of the
private/home use limitation in its manufacturing license. The
Court held the license restriction was valid under GE.3 ' As
the sale exceeded the scope of the licensee's rights under the
patent, the licensee/seller was unable to convey what it did
not have, the right to use under the patent.4 0 That, in turn,
meant the sale could not give the purchaser the right to use
the articles free of the patent. Exhaustion therefore did not
apply and the right to enforce the patent survived,4 1 making
the purchaser liable for patent infringement.4 2
In Adams, the license restriction raised a different issue.
Unlike GTP, the article at issue (a coffin lid) was
manufactured and sold by the licensee, Lockhart & Seelye, in
compliance with the ten-mile radius of Boston limitation
imposed on its rights, but was being used by the purchaser
elsewhere.4 3  That made the exhaustion issue whether the
purchaser of the "lawfully made and sold" coffin lid could use
and resell it outside the restriction on the licensee's rights
under the patent; or, stated in "servitude" terms, whether the
limitation on the licensee's right to manufacture and sell "ran
with the article" to constrain the purchaser as well.' The
Court held that it did not:
It seems to us that, although the right of Lockhart &
Seelye to manufacture, to sell, and to use these coffin-lids
was limited to the circle of ten miles around Boston, that a
39. Id. at 127.
40. GTP, 304 U.S. at 181-82.
41. GTP II, 305 U.S. at 127.
42. Id. The Court seems remarkably unconcerned about the transaction
costs involved in determining whether a particular article is subject to a patent
and, if so, whether its manufacture was authorized. Although the Court noted
that the purchaser had notice of the restriction, the rationale in GTP arguably
goes much further, exempting all sales of unauthorized articles from
exhaustion. Interestingly, the purchaser in the exhaustion cases has always
had notice, up to and including Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
553 U.S. 617 (2008). Consequently, the question of what effect the lack of notice
might have in a case has not been addressed by the Court. Cf. id. That
important issue and the related transaction costs concerns are discussed infra
notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
43. The Court's statement of the facts indicates the problem arose when the
purchaser (Burke) used the lid in its business located outside the ten-miles of
Boston limitation. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 454-55, 457 (1873).
44. Id. at 457.
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purchaser from them of a single coffin acquired the right
to use that coffin for the purpose for which all coffins are
used. That so far as the use of it was concerned, the
patentee had received his consideration, and it was no
longer within the monopoly of the patent. It would be to
engraft a limitation upon the right of use not
contemplated by the statute nor within the reason of the
contract to say that it could only be used within the ten-
miles [sic] circle.45
Read together, GE, GTP, and Adams create a coherent
whole. The exhaustion doctrine only applies when the article
has been lawfully manufactured and sold. That will always
be the case when the patent owner makes and sells the
article. Regarding manufacturing licensees, however, it
requires compliance with any valid restrictions on the scope
of the license. Otherwise, the license violation constitutes
infringement, exhaustion does not apply, and the patent
remains enforceable against the initial purchaser as well as
all subsequent owners or users.
The third baseline exhaustion principle addresses the
doctrine's specific effect on the patent rights. When
exhaustion applies, it only extinguishes the patent owner's
ability to sue for infringement based on post-sale use and
resale of the particular article. It does not "exhaust" the
patent right in its entirety.4 6 Consequently, patent owners
can still sue for infringement when purchasers make, use, or
sell additional articles.4 ' That distinction applies in straight-
forward fashion when a new article has been created. The
complication arises when changes are made to the specific
article acquired. That requires determining if and when such
changes move beyond the "use" authorized by exhaustion, and
instead become an impermissible "making" of a new article.
The Court has drawn that line by distinguishing between
"repairing" the article, which constitutes permissible use, and
"reconstruction," which does not.48  Although that inquiry
45. Id. at 456-57.
46. This important point is one of the arguments suggesting that the
doctrine should be identified as the "first sale doctrine," rather than "patent
exhaustion." See supra note 2.
47. See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 548 (1872).
48. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476
(1964); ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW &
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 914-15 (4th ed. 2007).
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poses significant practical line-drawing difficulties, the
rationale and approach are non-controversial. The repair-
reconstruction distinction rests on the same expectations logic
the Court used to support exhaustion generally.4 9 When
purchasing a patented article the buyer will reasonably
assume the right to use includes the ability to maintain the
purchased article in good working order, but not the right to
remake it at the end of its useful life.50
B. The Exhaustion Controversy
The exhaustion controversy arises from two related
issues: (1) Does the doctrine prohibit all post-sale patent
enforcement as a matter of public policy, thus precluding
"contracting around" by the parties, and (2) If exhaustion
prevents patent enforcement of post-sale restrictions, can
those restrictions still be enforced under contract law?51
The cases provide no clear answer to either question. A
straight-forward explanation exists for why the contract
enforcement issue remains unresolved. It has never been
expressly presented to the Court and, consequently, there has
not been an opportunity for its examination on the merits.5 2
The uncertainty regarding whether exhaustion is
mandatory, or merely a waivable default rule, arises from
ambiguous and even conflicting language in the Court's
exhaustion decisions. The Federal Circuit's decision in
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.53 lies at the center of the
controversy. Mallinckrodt had imposed a single use
restriction on sales of its patented medical device.54 When
Medipart resold devices it had obtained from those
"conditional" purchasers, Mallinckrodt sued Medipart for
patent infringement.5
49. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
50. See Mitchell, 83 U.S. at 548; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 48, at 914-
15.
51. The existence of the patent raises a third related issue: Whether the
patent right insulates post-sale limitations from the application of other laws
affecting their enforceability, in particular antitrust. The Court's determination
that it does not, and the relationship of that finding to exhaustion, is discussed
infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
52. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7
(2008).
53. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
54. Id. at 701.
55. Mallinckrodt claimed Medipart's activities both induced infringement by
1098 [Vol:51
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The district court held that "violation of the 'single use
only' notice can not be remedied by suit for patent
infringement." 6 On appeal, the Federal Circuit explicitly
addressed the question of whether under exhaustion "no
restriction or condition may be placed upon the sale of a
patented article" or "private parties retain the freedom to
contract concerning conditions of sale."" The panel
unequivocally held in favor of freedom of contract, finding
exhaustion operated as a default rule that the parties can
avoid by agreeing otherwise. When the parties have done
so, any activity exceeding otherwise lawful conditions59 will
constitute patent infringement.o
The Supreme Court's exhaustion precedents provide
support for both defenders and critics of Mallinckrodt. All
exhaustion arguments start from the Adams holding, stating
that "when [patented articles] are once lawfully made and
sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied for the
benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees."6 ' This is
the hospitals and directly infringed. See id.
56. Id. The Federal Circuit's opinion indicates the rationale for the District
Court's holding was somewhat unclear in that it combined elements of
unenforceability of the condition under the doctrine of patent misuse, but cited
to a variety of patent exhaustion precedents. See id. at 703-04. A fair reading
of the District Court's actual opinion, however, indicates a relatively clear and
straight-forward application of the mandatory view of patent exhaustion. See
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., No. 89 C 4524, 1990 WL 19535 (N.D. Ill.
1990), at *7-8.
57. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
58. See id. The court's citation to GTP ("that a restrictive license is legal
seems clear") is inappropriate. See id. at 704-05. GTP involved a license
limitation on the right to manufacture and sell, not on the resale of acquired
finished articles. As discussed earlier in this article, divisions of the patent
right permitting the making of new articles involve different policy
considerations and can (and should) be distinguished on the facts. See supra
notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
59. The panel also held that enforceability of a post-sale condition required
compliance with other applicable legal limitations, in particular those imposed
by the patent misuse doctrine. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d
700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
60. Id. The Federal Circuit has continued to adhere to the "default" view of
exhaustion. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (1997).
Mallinckrodt had also argued that Medipart's reconditioning of the devices
constituted infringement. The Federal Circuit found the repair versus
reconstruction distinction would be irrelevant if the condition was enforceable,
as "even repair of an unlicensed device constitutes infringement." This finding
is consistent with the Federal Circuit's non-mandatory approach to exhaustion.
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 709.
61. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 (1873) (emphasis in original).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
because the patent owner has in "the act of sale received all
the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his
invention in that particular machine or instrument."62  The
disagreement is over how to interpret that language. Does
the language mean that exhaustion eliminates all post-sale
patent enforcement, or can the parties avoid its application by
agreeing otherwise?
i. Exhaustion as a "Default"
Support for the Mallinckrodt default approach is found in
the doctrine's origins. In Mitchell v. Hawley,"3 decided prior
to and cited in Adams, the Court explained exhaustion's
application as follows:
Patentees acquire by their letters-patent the exclusive
right to make and use their patented inventions and to
vend to others to be used for the period of time specified in
the patent, but when they have made one or more of the
things patented, and have vended the same to others to be
used, they have parted to that extent with their exclusive
right, as they are never entitled to but one royalty for a
patented machine, and consequently a patentee, when he
has himself constructed a machine and sold it without any
conditions, or authorized another to construct, sell, and
deliver it, or to construct and use and operate it, without
any conditions, and the consideration has been paid to him
for the thing patented, the rule is well established that the
patentee must be understood to have parted to that extent
with all his exclusive right, and that he ceases to have any
interest whatever in the patented machine so sold and
delivered or authorized to be constructed and operated."4
The first part of this explanation tracks the "essential nature"
and single royalty rationales for exhaustion. The "without
any conditions" language, however, adds an important caveat,
indicating that exhaustion applies only when the patented
article is "so sold and delivered or authorized."
Subsequent cases eliminated the possibility that the
caveat in Mitchell was mere dicta. In Bauer & Cie. v.
O'Donnell, the patent owner put a notice on its
62. Id. at 456.
63. 83 U.S. 544 (1872).
64. Id. at 546-47 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 547.
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pharmaceutical products purporting to set a minimum resale
price.66 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by
certified question, asked the Supreme Court to determine
whether the defendant's resale for less than the indicated
minimum price constituted patent infringement." The
Court's explanation and its reasoning for holding that
exhaustion precluded an infringement claim reflects the need
to consider the Mitchell caveat before the doctrine can be
applied:
It is contended in argument that the notice in this case
deals with the use of the invention, because the notice
states that the package is licensed 'for sale and use at a
price not less than $1,' that a purchase is an acceptance of
the conditions, and that all rights revert to the patentee in
event of violation of the restriction. But in view of the
facts certified in this case, as to what took place concerning
the article in question, it is a perversion of terms to call the
transaction in any sense a license to use the invention ....
The packages were sold with as full and complete title as
any article could have when sold in the open market,
excepting only the attempt to limit the sale or use when
sold for not less than $1. In other words, the title
transferred was full and complete, with an attempt to
reserve the right to fix the price at which subsequent sales
could be made. There is no showing of a qualified sale for
less than value for limited use with other articles only, as
was shown in the Dick Case. There was no transfer of a
limited right to use this invention, and to call the sale a
license to use is a mere play upon words.6 1
If exhaustion prohibited all patent enforcement of post-
sale conditions, then the Court's extended inquiry would have
been irrelevant and unnecessary. Instead, the decision
carefully examines the specific facts surrounding the
particular condition to determine whether the transaction
was a sale conveying "full and complete" title,6 or merely a
"license" reflecting "transfer of a limited right to use this
invention." 0 That analysis clearly implies that had the facts
been otherwise-if the post-sale restriction reflected a
66. 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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restriction on the buyer's rights in return for payment of "less
than value for limited use"-then the patent infringement
claim would have survived.
Both Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co. 7 2 and Motion
Picture Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 73 decided on
the same day, reflect the Bauer "full and complete" versus
"limited right to use" distinction. In Straus, the Court
invalidated a resale price maintenance restriction based on
the exhaustion doctrine.7 4 Again, it did so by performing a
detailed analysis of the substance of the transaction, finding
on the facts that:
[The price restriction program] thus plainly is to sell
property for a full price, and yet to place restraints upon its
further alienation, such as have been hateful to the law
from Lord Coke's day to ours, because obnoxious to the
public interest. The scheme of distribution is not a system
designed to secure to the plaintiff and to the public a
reasonable use of its machines, within the grant of the
patent laws, but is in substance and in fact a mere price-
fixing enterprise, which, if given effect, would work great
and widespread injustice to innocent purchasers, for it
must be recognized that not one purchaser in many would
read such a notice, and that not one in a much greater
number, if he did read it, could understand its involved
and intricate phraseology, which bears many evidences of
being framed to conceal rather than to make clear its real
meaning and purpose. It would be a perversion of terms to
call the transaction intended to be embodied in this system
of marketing plaintiffs machines a "license to use the
invention."75
As in Bauer, the Court did not merely declare that
exhaustion barred all post-sale patent enforcement. Instead,
it determined on the specific facts that the buyer had paid
"full price" and it "would be a perversion of terms to call the
transaction . . . 'a license to use the invention."'7 6 That
assessment draws an express distinction between sales for
71. Id.
72. 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
73. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
74. Straus, 243 U.S. at 498-99.
75. Id. at 500-01 (quoting Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16 (1913))
(emphasis added).
76. Id.
1102 [Vol:51
PATENT EXHAUSTION
full price and those for "less than value for limited use,"77
strongly implying exhaustion applies only to the former and
not to the latter.
Motion Picture involved the sale of patented film
projectors subject to the limitation that they could only be
used to show certain films, and to other terms to be fixed by
the licensor." When the defendant, who had acquired the
projector from the original purchaser, violated the film
restriction, the patent owner sued for patent infringement.
The Court's exhaustion analysis specifically cited to Bauer,
articulating that case's holding as follows: "the right to vend
is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold
being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent and
rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may
attempt to put upon it." 0
The Court found the Bauer exhaustion analysis of the
patent "right to vend" applied with equal force to the patent
"right to use" implicated by the restrictions at issue." It
then, however, struck down the restriction for the following
reasons:
[I]t is not competent for the owner of a patent, by notice
attached to its machine, to, in effect, extend the scope of
its patent monopoly by restricting the use of it to
materials necessary in its operation, but which are no part
of the patented invention, or to send its machines forth
into the channels of trade of the country subject to
77. Id. Two additional points raised in Straus merit note. First, as with
many of the exhaustion cases the Court is clearly concerned with the
anticompetitive effects of finding the condition enforceable, a particular problem
as the Court had not yet found that the patent does not insulate the condition
from application of the antitrust laws. That subsequent determination
substantially changed the need for mandatory exhaustion, permitting the courts
to find a condition entirely unenforceable on other grounds. See infra at notes
113-122 and accompanying text. Second, Straus explicitly articulates the
notice problem raised by in rem patent enforcement of a post-sale condition-
the "great and widespread injustice to innocent purchasers." Straus, 243 U.S.
at 501. A similar concern is visible in other exhaustion cases, creating an early
manifestation of the "shrink-wrap/clickwrap" sufficient notice/deemed assent
problem currently bedeviling contract law. The possibility that concern justifies
exhaustion is dealt with infra notes 162-68 and 183-89 and accompanying text.
78. Motion Picture Co., 243 U.S. at 505.
79. Id. at 505-06.
80. Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be imposed
thereafter at the discretion of such patent owner. 82
Once again, the analysis goes beyond that required if
exhaustion prevented all patent enforcement of post-sale
restrictions. Instead, the Court looked to the specific facts,
finding the limitation unenforceable because it "extend[ed]
the scope of [the] patent monopoly" by requiring use of
materials falling outside the patent claims." Determining
the validity of the specific condition in an infringement action
would be entirely unnecessary unless some conditions escape
exhaustion's reach; an outcome consistent with a "conditional
sale" exception to the doctrine."
ii. Exhaustion as an Absolute (Per Se) Bar
The Court's precedents also support exhaustion as a
prohibition on all post-sale patent enforcement. The
argument starts from Motion Picture. That decision expressly
overruled the strongest conditional sale precedent," Henry v.
A.B. Dick Co."6 In A.B. Dick, the Court had explicitly
distinguished between unconditional and conditional sales
and expressly held exhaustion did not preclude post-sale
patent law enforcement of violations of restrictions imposed
in the latter kind of transaction.87 Although Motion Picture
was decided based on the unenforceability of the particular
condition on other grounds, 8 overruling A.B. Dick clearly
indicated that, at a minimum, the parties' ability to contract
around exhaustion had been significantly circumscribed.89
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. A logical explanation is that the Court finally decided to address the
anticompetitive effects of post-sale conditions directly, an interpretation
strongly supported by the fact that Motion Picture became the foundation for
the patent misuse doctrine. See Vincent Chiappetta, Living with Patents:
Insights from Patent Misuse, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 16-19 (2010).
85. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
518 (1917).
86. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
87. Id. at 24-25.
88. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
89. As A.B. Dick involved a tying arrangement, it specifically conflicted with
the outcome in Motion Picture invalidating the same kind of requirement. The
issue of how that interaction affects a reconciliation of the Court's exhaustion
cases is discussed infra at notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
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Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophoneo
decided a year later, strongly supports a wide-reaching
reading of Motion Picture's overruling of A.B. Dick. In
American Graphophone, the Court surveyed its prior
exhaustion cases including Bauer, Straus, and Motion
Picture. The Court interpreted Motion Picture as deciding:
[Tihat the rulings in Bauer v. O'Donnell and Straus v.
Victor Talking Machine Co. conflicted with the doctrine
announced and the rights sustained in Henry v. Dick, and
that case was consequently overruled. Reiterating the
ruling in the two last cases it was again decided that as by
virtue of the patent law one who had sold a patented
machine and received the price and had thus placed the
machine so sold beyond the confines of the patent law,
could not by qualifying restrictions as to use keep under
the patent monopoly a subject to which the monopoly no
longer applied."
That statement, omitting any reference to the possibility or
effect of "conditional sales," directly preceded the Court's
holding that:
There can be equally no doubt that the power to [impose
the price-fixing restriction] in derogation of the general
law was not within the monopoly conferred by the patent
law and that the attempt to enforce its apparent
obligations under the guise of a patent infringement was
not embraced within the remedies given for the protection
of the rights which the patent law conferred.92
Read together, these two statements can quite reasonably be
read as obviating any need to assess the substance of the
transaction or the condition because a sale triggers
exhaustion, and the exhaustion doctrine prevents all
enforcement of the post-sale condition "under the guise of
patent infringement."93
Two subsequent cases reinforce the absolute bar reading
of American Graphophone. In GE, 94 the Court, before finding
exhaustion entirely inapplicable to conditions limiting
manufacturing licenses," articulated the doctrine as follows:
90. 246 U.S. 8 (1918).
91. Id. at 25.
92. Id.
93. See Hungar, supra note 8, at 528.
94. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
95. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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"[ilt is well settled . . . that where a patentee makes the
patented article, and sells it, he can exercise no further
control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the
article after his purchase."96 In support of that clearly
unequivocal view of the "settled" law of exhaustion, the Court
specifically cited, among other cases, Mitchell, the source of
the "without any conditions" caveat.
The Court subsequently reaffirmed the GE absolute bar
articulation in United States v. Univis Lens Co.97 Univis had
included explicit resale price limitations in the licenses it
granted to make and/or sell its patented eyeglass lenses.9 8
The Department of Justice sued to enjoin enforcement of the
condition under the Sherman Act. 9 The key issue in the case
was "whether the [retail price maintenance] system . . . is
excluded by the patent monopoly from the operation of the
Sherman Act."' 00
Addressing the effect of exhaustion, the Court provided a
detailed supporting explication of the doctrine's operation and
effect:
The full extent of the monopoly is the patentee's "exclusive
right to make use, and vend the invention or discovery."
The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the
sale of his patent or in part by the sale of an artile [sic]
embodying the invention. His monopoly remains so long
as he retains the ownership of the patented article. But
sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the
patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent,
control the use or disposition of the article. . . .101
... The reward [the patent owner] [h]as demanded and
received is for the article and the invention which it
embodies and which his vendee is to practice upon it. He
has thus parted with his right to assert the patent
monopoly with respect to it and is no longer free to control
the price at which it may be sold either in its unfinished or
finished form....
96. GE, 272 U.S. at 489.
97. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
98. Id. at 243-45.
99. Id. at 242-43.
100. Id. at 243.
101. Id. at 250.
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Our decisions have uniformly recognized that the
purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any
particular article when the patentee has received his
reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the
article, and that once that purpose is realized the patent
law affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment
of the thing sold. 02
The Court then concluded by holding that, as exhaustion
prohibits "any further control over the article sold" by "virtue
of the patents," that regime could not insulate the condition
from application of the antitrust laws."0 '
The above language reaffirms both that exhaustion
operates as a blanket prohibition on post-sale patent
enforcement and the underlying "single royalty" rationale for
that outcome. A patent gives the owner the right to demand
whatever compensation he can obtain for the patented article
at the time of sale. Upon payment of that consideration,
however, the patent owner has "parted with his right to
assert the patent monopoly" putting post-sale conditions
beyond the patent's reach.104
C. Reconciling the Positions
The traditional method for producing coherence among
conflicting cases is to look for distinctions that permit
reconciliation. 0 5  Unfortunately, applying that approach to
the Court's exhaustion cases does not produce a satisfactory
resolution. Absolute prohibition proponents attempt to
explain away the "conditional sale" caveat by arguing that
phrase must be read in its contemporaneous context. 106
Specifically, they note (with justification) that at the time
Mitchell, Bauer, Straus, and Motion Picture were decided,
"conditional sale" referred to conditions precedent to the
102. Id. at 251.
103. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942). In reaching
the conclusion, the Court noted that the "Court in [GE] was at a paints [sic] to
point out that a patentee who manufactures the product protected by the patent
and fails to retain his ownership in it can not control the price at which it is sold
by his distributors." Id.
104. Id. at 251.
105. In many of the exhaustion cases, the statements of the doctrine are
technically dicta, and thus could be dismissed on that ground. But as the Court
is generally making those statements to articulate the full operation of the
doctrine, a closer analysis on the merits is justified.
106. See Hungar, supra note 8, at 532.
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passing of title, not to conditions limiting the rights
ultimately conveyed. Thus understood, the caveat only
indicates that patent owners may retain patent control over
use of an article while they retain ownership. Once any
conditions to transfer are satisfied and title passes to the
buyer, exhaustion triggers and the patent no longer applies to
post-sale use.
The argument ignores the actual assessment performed
in the cases. None of the cases mention whether title had or
had not passed to the buyer. Nor do they make any inquiry
into whether the particular conditions at issue were
precedent to transfer of title. Instead, they distinguish
between sales conveying "full and complete title" to articles
"sold and delivered" at "full price," and "qualified sale [s] for
less than value for limited use" transferring "a limited right
to use" as a "license."' 7 That inquiry clearly assumes the
buyer "owns" the article. The relevant exhaustion issue is
whether the buyer paid for (and was thus entitled to) full
post-sale rights to use and resell, or whether the buyer only
paid for something less. 108
The argument for a default view of exhaustion is, in the
end, equally unsatisfactory. It requires explaining away the
overruling of A.B. Dick in Motion Picture, as well as the
unequivocal per se exhaustion language in American
Graphophone, GE and, most problematically, Univis. The
absolute bar statement in GE is the easiest to resolve. In
that case, the Court only raised exhaustion to make the point
that the doctrine did not apply to conditions in licenses to
make and sell under the patent.109 Because exhaustion did
not control, there was no need for precision regarding the
doctrine's details. That reading is consistent with the Court's
restatement of the doctrine at the conclusion of the opinion.
Rather than reiterating its earlier unqualified no post-sale
patent enforcement statement, the Court instead tracked the
Mitchell/Bauer caveated rule. "[A] patentee may not attach
107. See supra notes 63-71.
108. The answer turns, first, on whether the sale reflects less than an
absolute right to use or resell in return for less than full value (indicating that
the "single royalty" premise for exhaustion did not apply and, consequently,
neither did the doctrine); and, second, whether the specific restriction on post-
sale use or resale was legally enforceable under other applicable law. See id.
109. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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to the article made by him or with his consent a condition
running with the article in the hands of purchasers limiting
the price which one who becomes its owner for full
consideration shall part with it.""o
The Motion Picture overruling of A.B. Dick and the
absolute language found in American Graphophone and
Univis require more detailed analysis. Those cases all
involved post-sale conditions allegedly violating either the
patent misuse doctrine or the antitrust laws-a tying
restriction in the first case, and resale price maintenance in
the latter two cases. The defendant patent owner argued its
patent insulated the conditions from application of those
laws. If exhaustion freed the articles from the patent, then
that defense would fail.
Interpreted in that context, the Court's overruling A.B.
Dick in Motion Picture can be read as entirely consistent with
the default view of exhaustion. Although the Court explicitly
affirmed that exhaustion prevents patent enforcement of
post-sale conditions on use, it specifically indicated it only did
so in a "single, unconditional sale.""' Then, rather than
determining the caveat should be eliminated, the Court
decided the case on other grounds. Specifically it held:
[W]e are convinced that the exclusive right granted in
every patent must be limited to the invention described in
the claims of the patent, and that it is not competent for
the owner of a patent, by notice attached to its machine,
to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly by
restricting the use of it to materials necessary to its
operation, but which are no part of the patented invention
or to send its machines forth into the channels of trade of
the country subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be
paid to be imposed thereafter at the discretion of such
patent owner. 112
A.B. Dick, an opinion that upheld a similar tying
restriction, clearly could not survive the determination in
Motion Picture that such a post-sale limitation is
unenforceable because it exceeds the scope of the patent
110. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 494 (emphasis added).
111. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
516 (1917).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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claims."' But as the Court noted in GE, the Motion Picture
reasoning only requires overruling A.B. Dick to the extent its
holding insulates post-sale conditions from examination
under other laws." 4 It does not mandate that exhaustion
prevent all patent enforcement of post-sale conditions. The
Court's actual analysis in Motion Picture is consistent with
that limited reading. Requiring individual post-sale
conditions to be examined for "scope of the patent" validity
before deciding whether a patent infringement claim can be
made, would be entirely unnecessary if exhaustion precluded
all such enforcement. 115
The same relationship between post-sale patent
enforcement and invalidity under other laws can be clearly
seen in American Graphophone. There, the Court held:
Applying the cases thus reviewed [both exhaustion and
antitrust prohibition on retail price maintenance] there
can be no doubt that the alleged price-fixing contract
disclosed in the certificate was contrary to the general law
and void. There can be equally no doubt that the power to
make it in derogation of the general law was not within the
monopoly conferred by the patent law and that the attempt
to enforce its apparent obligations under the guise of a
patent infringement was not embraced within the
remedies given for the protection of the rights which the
patent law conferred.'1 '
This statement parallels the Motion Picture analysis that
patent rights do not prevent examination of conditions for
113. In Motion Picture, the Court moved beyond exhaustion and directly
addressed the potential anticompetitive effects of post-sale restrictions imposed
in patent transactions. The case develops the foundation for the patent misuse
doctrine which prevents patent rights from shielding harmful conditions from
invalidity under laws of "general" application. See id. at 514; see generally,
Chiappetta, supra note 84; Hovenkamp, supra note 8. Although mandatory
exhaustion would prevent that outcome, it would both over-shoot the mark,
preventing net beneficial post-sale patent enforcement, and fail to resolve the
problem by allowing contract law enforcement of harmful conditions.
114. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 493 (1926).
115. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. The point in the text
also explains the Motion Picture Court's invalidation of the "conditions as to use
or royalty to be paid, to be imposed thereafter at the discretion of such patent
owner." Motion Picture Co., 243 U.S. at 516. The condition's unenforceability
was based on the open-ended discretion reserved by the patent owner, not a
blanket prohibition of post-sale conditions under exhaustion. If it were the
latter, there would have been no need to note the reserved discretion.
116. Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphaphone, 246 U.S. 8, 25 (1918).
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other legal limitations on their enforcement. " And, again, if
exhaustion eliminated all post-sale patent enforcement of
restrictions on use or resale with regard to a specific article, it
would be unnecessary to determine whether the specific
condition fell "within the monopoly conferred by the patent
law."118
Univis, however, provides an insurmountable obstacle to
treating exhaustion as a default doctrine. Unlike Motion
Picture or American Graphophone, the decision explicitly
references and relies on exhaustion to explain why patent law
does not insulate post-sale conditions from the application of
other laws. The Court specifically held that because the
doctrine prevents all patent enforcement of post-sale
conditions, such conditions cannot, by definition, remain
"within the protection of the patent law."H'9 Nor does the
argument that the particular sales were at "full value," and
thus satisfied the exhaustion caveat, find any support in the
Court's analysis. Nothing in the statement of the facts
indicates the issue has any bearing whatsoever on
exhaustion, nor does the actual analysis contain any mention
of full, as opposed to limited, value as a relevant
consideration. 120 Even the citation to GE points to that
decision's initial unequivocal statement of the doctrine, not
the later "full consideration" articulation.12 ' Moreover, Univis
provides affirmative support for the per se argument
regarding the meaning of "conditional sale," stating that
exhaustion applies whenever the seller "fails to retain
ownership [in the article]."122
D. The Quanta Decision
Many observers hoped the Supreme Court would resolve
this confused state of affairs and provide a definitive
117. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942) (reading
and citing both the patent misuse doctrine derived from Motion Picture and
American Graphophone in this way). Masonite also tracks the conditional sale
approach to exhaustion, finding the doctrine applicable when "there has been
such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee has
received his reward for the use of the article." Id. at 278.
118. Am. Graphaphone, 246 U.S. at 22.
119. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942).
120. Id. at 243-47, 251-52.
121. Id. at 252.
122. Id.
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resolution in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.123
There, Intel had produced and sold chip sets under a license
from LG Electronics (LGE) to use its patents. 1 24  Quanta
purchased the chips and used them in its computer
systems.125  LGE asserted that the use exceeded Intel's
manufacturing authorization and sued Quanta for
infringement.12 6  Quanta countered that exhaustion
eliminated LGE's right to post-sale patent enforcement. 127
Although the stage was set, clarification was not
forthcoming. In fact, the unanimous opinion seems oddly
oblivious to the debate over the proper interpretation of the
Court's exhaustion precedents. Neither the summary of the
cases, nor the exhaustion analysis directly raises, much less
addresses, the absolute bar versus default issue, instead
providing only Delphic pronouncements that generated
further ambiguity and conflicting interpretations.128
The absolute bar position finds support in aspects of the
opinion's summary of the exhaustion precedents, its heavy
reliance on Univis, and the substantive analysis supporting
the finding that exhaustion bars LGE's post-sale
infringement action. On its face, the Court's summary of the
prior cases seems to favor the per se prohibition position. It
first interprets A.B. Dick as "permit[ting] postsale restrictions
on the use of a patented article."1 2 9 It then notes that A.B.
Dick was not applied in Bauer and was explicitly overruled in
Motion Picture."0
Unfortunately, however, the review is not as definitive as
it seems, leaving myriad open questions. There is no
discussion of the "less than limited rights" language expressly
used to distinguish A.B. Dick in Bauer, or the "unconditional
sale" language in Motion Picture that was cited without
comment.13 ' Even more problematically, the Federal Circuit's
Mallinckrodt decision, directly conflicting with an absolute
123. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
124. Id. at 617.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra note 8.
129. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625-28
(2008).
130. See id.
131. Id.
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bar reading of the summary, 132 is not even mentioned.133 If
the Court intended its summary of the doctrine to resolve the
conflicting "bar or default" readings of its prior cases in favor
of the former, it easily could have spoken much more
clearly.134
The reliance on Univis argument fairs no better. 35 The
Court did expressly make the case controlling at one point in
the opinion, stating, "[wie agree with Quanta that Univis
governs this case."136 Interpreting that holding as confirming
the absolute bar position, however, goes too far. Read in
context, the Court is clearly only relying on (and reaffirming)
Univis with regard to the threshold question of when an
article sufficiently embodies a patent to trigger exhaustion,
most particularly with regard to process claims.1 37
The opinion's actual substantive exhaustion analysis is
more convincing, but non-definitive. The Court first
distinguished GTP, finding Intel's license unrestricted on the
facts, thus making Intel's manufacture and sale duly
authorized. 3 8 It next found LGE's intent to impose post-sale
restrictions on Intel's purchasers irrelevant, stating that
"exhaustion turns only on Intel's own license to sell products
practicing the LGE Patents."s39  The opinion concludes by
holding that "Iblecause Intel was authorized to sell its
products to Quanta, the doctrine of patent exhaustion
prevents LGE from further asserting its patent rights with
respect to the patents substantially embodied by those
products." 40
132. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
133. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625-28. The argument that the patent holder,
LGE, chose not to defend or rely on the case is unconvincing. Cf. Hungar, supra
note 8, at 530 (raising it as a possibility). As the Court was certainly aware of
the issue, the better argument is that it felt that the facts made resolving the
broader question raised by Mallinckrodt unnecessary to resolution of the case
before it. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
134. Even if the Court did not need to resolve the debate, the opportunity to
provide much-needed and beneficial clarification of its own precedents called for
a less parsimonious use of dicta in its restatement of the existing law. See supra
note 133.
135. See Hungar, supra note 8, at 532.
136. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 631(2008).
137. See id. at 631-35.
138. See id. at 635.
139. Id. at 637.
140. Id.
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The final summary of the exhaustion holding articulates
the blanket per se position even more clearly:
The authorized sale of an article that substantially
embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's rights and
prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to
control postsale use of the article . . . . Nothing in the
License Agreement limited Intel's ability to sell its
products practicing the LGE Patents. Intel's authorized
sale to Quanta thus took its products outside the scope of
the patent monopoly, and as a result, LGE can no longer
assert its patent rights against Quanta. 141
As dispositive as the above analysis seems, its power
fades when read in the context of the actual facts.
Specifically, to apply exhaustion as an absolute bar requires a
valid restriction upon which it can operate. Although the
buyer, Quanta, had received notice "that LGE had not
licensed [Intel's] customers to practice its patents," 142 LGE
was not the seller of the specific patented articles. Instead,
they were produced and sold by Intel under its license.
Avoiding exhaustion on those facts requires a valid restriction
in Intel's license. Regarding that issue, as the Court points
out, LGE's desires or intent are irrelevant.'43 The license
must in fact legally restrict Intel's authority to make and sell
the particular goods under the patents. Because it did not,
Intel's authorized making and unconditional sale of the
patented articles triggered exhaustion and prohibited LGE
from enforcing its patents based on use or resale by the
purchasers. 144
This fact-based interpretation also explains the apparent
gaps in the Court's analysis.'4 5 Determining whether
exhaustion applied on the Quanta facts only required the
Court to make the two findings in the opinion. First, that
under Univis, exhaustion applies to process patents,
141. Id. at 638.
142. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
143. Id. at 636-37.
144. Nothing indicates that the Intel sales to Quanta were conditional. But
even had they been, as Intel was not the patent owner, those restrictions would
have no relevance to LGE's ability to enforce its patents against downstream
acquirers/users. This fact fully explains the Court's statement that "exhaustion
turns only on Intel's own license to sell products practicing the LGE patents."
Id. at 627.
145. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. If a case ever called for
judicious use of dicta, however, this was it. See supra note 134.
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triggering the doctrinal inquiry. Second, no restriction was
imposed on Intel's manufacture and sale, thus avoiding GTP.
Because no "conditional sale" was involved, the "per se versus
default" exhaustion issue never arose. That made addressing
either the "unconditional sale" caveat in Motion Picture or the
Federal Circuit's Mallinckrodt decision unnecessary to the
resolution of the case.
This reading of Quanta also sheds useful light on an
important undercurrent in many of the earlier exhaustion
cases: What is required to prevent the doctrine from
applying? The decision's reference to Quanta's knowledge
that LGE desired a post-sale restriction tracks the strong
implication in a number of those opinions that adequate
notice is a condition precedent. 46  More importantly, the
Court's focus on the "structure of the Intel-LGE
transaction,"' despite Quanta's clear knowledge of LGE's
desired limitation, indicates that even actual notice will not
suffice. To avoid exhaustion the limitation must be expressly
included in the terms of the bargained-for exchange, making
the transaction in substance a transfer of only a limited right
to use for less than full value. 4 8  In short, the Court in
Quanta seems to be making the same point articulated in
Hobbie v. Jennison149 over a century ago, regarding what is
required for a licensee restriction to preclude a finding of
exhaustion:
It is easy for a patentee to protect himself and his
assignees when he conveys exclusive rights under the
patent for particular territory. He can take care to bind
every licensee or assignee, if he gives him the right to sell
articles made under the patent, by imposing conditions
which will prevent any other licensee or assignee from
being interfered with."o
146. See supra note 77.
147. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 636.
148. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text (discussing the Bauer and
Straus examination of the substance of the transaction to determine whether
exhaustion applied).
149. 149 U.S. 355 (1893).
150. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
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E. Concluding Thoughts on the Status Quo
The Court's exhaustion jurisprudence has not produced a
final answer on the "absolute prohibition-default contract-
around" question. The resulting confusion is highly
problematic in the real world, where post-sale restrictions can
be found in abundance. The possibility of post-sale patent
enforcement considerably ups the individual and social ante.
Buyers without sufficient motivation or funds will simply
comply to avoid the increased exposure, even when contract
expectation damages would produce a better personal (and
perhaps social) outcome. Those willing and able to resist
must still determine whether the highly unpredictable and
potentially damaging outcome merits the investment of time
and resources. Conversely, if patent owners cannot be
assured that conditional sales will be enforced in accordance
with their terms, including against downstream owners and
users, they will be less willing to agree to lower prices in
exchange for restrictions on use or resale. Therefore, it is
important to eliminate the current confusion, and to establish
clear and reliable rules governing the doctrine's application.
PART II: THE POLICY INQUIRY
Resolving the exhaustion conundrum requires answering
the two open questions: (1) Is exhaustion mandatory or a
waivable default, and (2) When the doctrine applies, does it
prevent contract enforcement of the post-sale condition? The
appropriate answers will be those that best deliver on what
society has decided patent law should produce.
In the United States, identifying the raison d'9tre for
patent law is straight-forward. Patent law exists to overcome
a specific problem faced in advancing our commercial law
system's primary goal of fostering efficient market
operation-the free-riding disincentive to invest in
innovation.'5 ' To solve that problem, the regime implements
a market-based solution. By granting innovators the legal
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling their
151. See, e.g., Chiappetta, supra note 84, at 8-12. Mere adoption of the
market "failure" approach does not make it "correct" in the normative sense.
Other equally legitimate alternative views of intellectual property rights have,
in fact, been adopted by other societies. See id.; Chiappetta, supra note 1, at
375-81 (making the point that these normative differences make the
international exhaustion issue extremely complicated).
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inventions, a patent permits them to capture whatever
market returns their investments might produce.
But patent law must do more than create maximum
incentives. It must also advance the over-arching goal of
increasing market efficiency. 152 That requires the regime to
produce an optimal' overall improvement when its
innovation benefits are netted against the inefficiencies
caused by the right to exclude.
A. The Efficient Market Justifications for Exhaustion
The net efficiency improvement requirement provides the
necessary metric for assessing the usefulness of exhaustion
within the current patent law paradigm. The doctrine may
help ensure that patent law produces optimally efficient
incentives to innovate in one of two ways. It may prevent
post-sale patent enforcement from producing net harm to the
basic assumptions required for an efficient market-for
example, increased transaction costs or undue interference
with competition. Or, exhaustion may function as an
inherent limitation within the patent system itself, essential
to preventing excessive direct costs from the right to
exclude-for example, unjustified higher prices and resulting
deadweight loss.' 4
The "basic assumptions" argument supports legal
interventions when they help move the unruly real world into
better alignment with the theoretical assumptions required
for efficient market operation. In particular, intervention
should reduce transaction costs, eliminate externalities,
152. See Chiappetta, supra note 84, at 11-14.
153. "Optimal" requires that patent law do more than produce a net
efficiency gain. The regime must produce the best possible net gain under the
circumstances. Consequently, whenever two competing approaches are
compared, the one that produces the "greater" net improvement should be
adopted. The comparative assessment is directly relevant to assessing the
merits of the exhaustion doctrine. The question is not whether the regime
operates on a net positive basis with exhaustion, but whether it operates more
efficiently than without the doctrine.
154. Whether exhaustion helps produce optimal net incentives is obviously
an empirical question. The paucity of necessary data makes a reliable, much
less an actual, factual determination impossible. The common "second best"
approach-"thought experiments" designed to assess the likely outcome under
the particular circumstances on logical grounds-is used here to make an
educated guess as to whether the exhaustion doctrine advances that objective.
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enhance information, or foster increased competition.'5 s It is
not enough, however, for such interventions to produce gains
in a particular assumption, for example by increasing
available information. The inefficiencies caused by the
intervention-for example, the costs of providing information
under the legal requirement-must also be considered.
Consequently, for exhaustion to pass muster, it must do more
than prevent inefficiencies arising from post-sale patent
enforcement. It must also be the best solution to the problem;
that is, the approach producing the maximum overall
improvement in efficient market operation.
The "basic assumptions" argument provides strong
support for treating exhaustion as a default legal term,
completing transactions when the parties have been silent
regarding the patent owner's post-sale enforcement rights. It
does not, however, support exhaustion as a mandatory (i.e.,
per se) prohibition that prevents the parties from agreeing to
the contrary. Although post-sale patent enforcement raises
legitimate basic assumption concerns, per se exhaustion lacks
the nuance essential to obtaining maximally efficient
outcomes. The preferred solution involves more tailored legal
interventions directed at the source of the specific post-sale
patent enforcement problem.
i. Exhaustion as a Default
The case for an exhaustion default rule tracks the
reduced transaction cost argument that generally supports
contract terms implied by operation of law. Contract
negotiation is an expensive and time-consuming business.
The law can help reduce those costs by providing default
terms that fill "gaps" left by the parties in their negotiation.
To be beneficial, however, the default contract terms must be
appropriate to the transaction. Appropriate default terms
should approximate the result the parties would have reached
had they actually discussed the matter. Achieving that goal
requires determining what reasonable parties would
generally agree to, and thus would likely expect, under the
circumstances.
The implied seller's warranty of good and unencumbered
title in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides a
155. See Chiappetta, supra note 84, at 9-11.
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relevant example of the approach.'16  The substantive
warranty reflects the reasonable assumption that in
transactions in goods, the parties generally intend to convey
full and clear title upon payment of the purchase price. But it
only operates as a default. Parties can eliminate the
warranty by satisfying the statutory requirements for its
removal.' Those requirements ensure that the buyer
receives reasonable notice that the proposed transaction does
not conform to the "normal" expectations regarding title.
This scheme permits negotiating adjustments to the bargain
before proceeding with the purchase.
The same rationale applies to treating exhaustion as a
default term when the sale involves a patented article. As
the Court noted in Adams, the "essential nature" of such a
transaction makes it logical to assume that when the parties
have not addressed post-sale patent rights, they intend the
sale of the article "whose sole value is in its use" to permit
post-sale use free of the patent.1 5 8 Consequently, the law can
usefully fill the "gap" by deploying exhaustion to eliminate
any patent law interference with that expectation.5 9
When parties do address the issue, basic contract law
(and related efficiency) principles call for implementation of
their bargain, provided it does not violate public policy.6 o
Some purchasers will only want an article for a limited use,
for example, for a private rather than commercial application,
or to merely consume the ink in a printer cartridge or the
156. See U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (2007).
157. See U.C.C. § 2-312(2) (2007).
158. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
159. It is important to note that patent law's inherent operation provides a
particularly strong justification for the default outcome. Because patents
prevent any unauthorized sale or use of the article, the parties' agreement need
not contain an express limitation to trigger infringement. The exhaustion
default prevents the ridiculous outcome that purchasers literally could not use
or resell the article they acquired. Although eliminating the inherent post-sale
patent limitations on use or sale offers a strong justification for a default
exhaustion rule, it does not address the more complicated intent and
expectation issues raised when the parties expressly include limitations on use
or resale in return for a reduction in price. How to deal with these issue lies at
the heart of the per se versus default debate, and the Court's failure to explicitly
make this distinction creates some of the confusion in the cases.
160. The Court's holding that patent law does not insulate conditions from
application of other laws of general application (including antitrust) eliminates
the concern that the agreement may cause other efficiency or public policy
difficulties. See supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text.
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medicine in a syringe. In such instances, buyers would
happily accept patent-enforced limitations on other post-sale
use or resale as the quid pro quo for a reduced purchase
price. 16 1 Moreover, the reliability of such enforcement will
encourage the patent owner to agree to the arrangement.
Treating exhaustion as a waivable default accommodates
these interests, facilitating tailoring of individual bargains to
the particular circumstances.
Although a default rule maximizes transactional
flexibility, it also raises an information
asymmetry/transaction cost problem. For a default term to
operate properly, contracting parties must know it exists and
know when it does not apply. The rationale for creating the
default addresses the former concern. As the doctrine tracks
the parties' normal expectations regarding post-sale use and
resale under the circumstances, reasonable people will not be
surprised to discover the law has added exhaustion to their
bargain, even though it was not explicitly negotiated.
The U.C.C. Article 2 approach to the implied warranty of
title provides baseline insight into what should be required
for eliminating the default. 1 62  Because purchasers will
generally assume good and clear title will be conveyed, and
purchasers will be harmed if that does not occur, the U.C.C.
places the burden of disclaimer on the seller who obtains the
benefit. The same basic requirement should apply to
exhaustion. At a minimum, patent owners seeking to avoid
exhaustion should be required to demonstrate that the
161. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (1997);
Kieff, supra note 2, at 316-17.
162. See U.C.C. art. 2 (2007). The elimination/waiver issue has been
confused by the inappropriate conflation of exhaustion with the "implied
license" doctrine. Although both concepts rest on the parties' likely intent to
limit claims for infringement, they operate very differently. An implied patent
license frees the individual buyer from specific patent constraints based on the
particular circumstances of the actual transaction. Exhaustion reflects an a
priori determination that in every sale of a patented article, reasonable parties
will normally intend and expect elimination of all post-sale patent enforcement
rights. Consequently, nothing further is required for exhaustion to arise than
the sales transaction itself. The crucial intent inquiry, therefore, is whether the
facts indicate that the specific parties had a contrary intent. See Quanta
Computer Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 (2008); Julie E. Cohen
& Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1, 30-33 (2001).
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purchaser had either actual knowledge,16 3 or a reason to
know,'" of the change.
The current contract debate over the acceptance of terms
included in browse-wrap, shrink-wrap, or click-wrap
agreements can usefully inform the exhaustion default waiver
requirements regarding adequacy of notice. 165  The same
basic issue is involved-the need to find an appropriate
balance between the costs of giving notice and ensuring that
buyers have a reasonable opportunity to protect their
interests. Regarding exhaustion, however, other important
considerations should control the outcome. An exhaustion
waiver would impose substantial limitations enforceable
against the original purchaser, as well as other down-stream
owners and users, through the patent regime's powerful
property rules remedies. 166 Avoiding such an unexpected and
substantial change to the parties' bargain having significant
third party effects supports a much higher waiver standard-
requiring proof that the purchaser explicitly agreed,'6 ' not
merely to post-sale patent enforcement, but to the specific
limitations on use or resale to which the waiver applies.'6 8
163. Cf U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(b).
164. Cf U.C.C. § 2-312(2).
165. See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CI. L.
REV. 1449, 1473-79 (2004); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes,
96 GEO. L.J. 885, 924-40 (making the good point that the problem of inattentive
purchasers is magnified in the lower cost, more routine environment of personal
property transactions).
166. As noted above, eliminating exhaustion does not merely permit patent
enforcement of conditions, but can create the ludicrous outcome that even when
the parties' agreement imposes no express restrictions on post-sale use or
transfer, the inherent operation of patent law would prevent the buyer from all
use or resale of the article. See supra note 159. The important problem of
adequate notice of the restriction to downstream owners and users is addressed
infra at notes 183-189.
167. The Bauer and Straus inquiries into the substance of the transaction
(see supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text) and the Quanta decision,
making even actual notice insufficient to permit post-sale patent enforcement
(see supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text), all point in this direction.
Ensuring a valid waiver does not impose undue transaction costs on subsequent
conveyances is addressed in the next section.
168. The requirement that explicit restrictions in the parties' actual
agreement trigger infringement addresses the problem of the inherent patent
limitation on all use. See supra notes 159 and 166. As it is inconceivable that
any rational buyer would agree to such a restriction, it is both appropriate and
reasonable to require the scope of the waiver be expressly articulated. That
requirement also helps address the behavioral economics point that buyers are
not only unlikely to pay attention, but when they do, they will overly discount
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Treating exhaustion as a default term also resolves the
second open exhaustion issue-how the doctrine's application
should affect contract (or other legal) enforcement of post-sale
conditions. Under the default approach, exhaustion becomes
part of the agreement terms analysis, with its application
determined by the specific requirements governing its waiver.
If the parties' agreement imposes no post-sale restrictions on
use or resale, then no enforceable contractual limitations
exist and the unwaived exhaustion default eliminates
unexpected post-sale patent-related restrictions on use or
resale.16 s If the parties' agreement contains a post-sale
limitation, but fails to address exhaustion, a breach triggers
contract rights. But the lack of an effective waiver leaves the
exhaustion default in place, and it prevents patent
enforcement of the restriction. In agreements including
restrictions and addressing exhaustion, contract enforcement
remains governed by that regime's generally applicable rules
and the exhaustion outcome will, independently, depend on
the effectiveness of the waiver. If, as should be the rule,
waiver requires explicit acceptance by the purchaser, 1 0 the
patent right will survive only if the patent owner can prove
the buyer agreed that the waiver applies to the particular
restriction at issue.
One final point affects patent enforcement of post-sale
restrictions, even when properly waived under the default
rule. As the Court has properly held, the overarching goal of
ensuring efficient market operation requires that patent law
not insulate conditions from examination under other laws of
general application, including antitrust law."' When a
restriction is found unenforceable on such grounds, not only
does the finding render it unenforceable under contract law,
it also precludes a patent infringement action even with a
valid waiver.
the cost of future limitations by focusing the parties' on the specific effect of the
waiver. See Van Houweling, supra note 165, at 939-40.
169. The exhaustion default avoids the patent's inherent limitation on any
use or resale by the purchaser. See supra notes 159 and 166.
170. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 113-22, 160 and accompanying text. See also
Chiappetta, supra note 84, at 26-29.
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ii. Exhaustion as an Absolute Bar (Per Se Prohibition)
The "basic assumptions" argument for a blanket
prohibition of all post-sale patent enforcement of contractual
limitations on use or resale of patented articles raises
legitimate concerns, but ultimately fails. 17 2  Justification
requires that the per se rule reliably produce the maximum
possible net improvement in efficient market operation.
The exhaustion cases provide little explicit policy support
for a per se prohibition. Most do no more than articulate the
"single royalty" rationale-that when the patent owner has
been paid in full, the buyer should obtain the article free of
the patent. That argument only logically supports treating
exhaustion as a default rule applicable when the transaction
is for "full value," but not otherwise."1 3  The Motion Picture
analysis could, perhaps, be read as offering a different
justification-that exhaustion exists to prevent post-sale
restrictions from extending the scope of the patent monopoly.
But that argument would permit patent enforcement of all
restrictions found to fall within the scope of the patent, an
outcome inconsistent with a per se ban. 174
More importantly to the net effects inquiry, none of the
cases raise, much less address, the efficiency gains produced
by permitting post-sale patent enforcement of restrictions on
use or resale.17 5  By increasing the reliability of limitations
imposed in return for reduced consideration, such
enforcement encourages greater use of conditional sales.1 7 1
That transactional flexibility, in turn, increases access to
inventions legally controlled by the patent owners. Moreover,
the returns from such transactions can also increase the
172. The default approach would prevent enforcement of a patent's inherent
prohibition on all post-sale use or resale unless a valid waiver has been
obtained-something highly unlikely to be forthcoming. See supra note 168 and
accompanying text. The key blanket exhaustion issue, therefore, is whether the
parties can waive exhaustion and permit post-sale patent enforcement of
restrictions that are explicitly accepted by the purchaser. See supra notes 162-
68 and accompanying text (discussing the acceptance and specificity
requirements for a valid waiver).
173. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
175. In contrast to the Court's exhaustion jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit
cases not only address the benefits, but identify them as justifying post-sale
patent enforcement in conditional sales. See supra note 161.
176. See supra note 175; Kieff, supra note 2, at 316-17.
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value of patents, enhancing the regime's targeted incentives
to invest in innovation. 117
Ironically, the best argument for a per se exhaustion rule
is only mentioned in passing by the Court in Straus v. Victor
Talking Machine Co. 118 There, the Court connected the
doctrine to restraints on alienation that "have been hateful to
the law from Lord Coke's day to ours, because obnoxious to
the public interest.""17  The primary difficulty with looking to
restraint on alienation for justification is that, as in Straus,
its assertion frequently does no more than posit harm without
offering any supporting explanation.1 80 That lack of specifics
is particularly problematic in the current patent law
efficiency paradigm. The required showing that exhaustion
produces a net overall improvement in market operation
makes it insufficient to point out the obvious fact that
allowing post-sale patent enforcement of contractual
restrictions on use or resale further impairs the free
movement of patented articles in the market." It must be
demonstrated that the removal of that constraint produces
the optimal net outcome in light of the resulting forgone
transactional flexibility and incentives to innovate.
Excellent articles by Professors Robinson, Hovenkamp,
and Van Houweling helpfully round-up the more specific
efficiency arguments supporting per se exhaustion. 18  They
177. As discussed above, merely increasing the incentives is insufficient; the
incentives must be optimal in light of the costs. See supra notes 151-53 and
accompanying text. But any increase in incentives cannot simply be ignored; it
must be included in the net gains or losses assessment on the facts.
178. 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
179. Id. at 501.
180. See Robinson, supra note 165, at 1480-81.
181. At first glance, exhaustion seems oddly conceived if ensuring the free
movement of goods is the doctrine's objective. As it only prevents patent
enforcement of post-sale conditions, it does not preclude their existence or
enforcement under contract law. One possible response would be that when
exhaustion applies, it also precludes contract enforcement (answering that
second open exhaustion issue in the negative). But that would effectively
invalidate all post-sale limitations on the use or resale of patented articles,
eliminating all transactional flexibility. The better argument is that
enforcement should be limited to contract law, thus eliminating the much
greater "in rem" reach of patent infringement actions and thereby increasing
the free flow of patented articles in the after-market. That argument requires
closer investigation, an inquiry found later in the text. See infra notes 221-42
and accompanying text.
182. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8; Robinson, supra note 165; Van
Houweling, supra note 165.
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identify three "basic assumption" concerns raised by patent
enforcement of post-sale restrictions on the use or resale of
patented articles: (1) increased downstream transaction costs,
(2) resource misallocations and waste, and (3) undue
interference with competition and innovation.
Patent law's objective of producing optimal incentives to
invest in innovation frames and focuses the inquiry into these
concerns. That metric requires that per se exhaustion do
more than produce a net overall improvement in efficient
market operation. It must provide the optimal solution.
Consequently, even if the per se rule results in a net
efficiency improvement, if another solution delivers a better
net outcome, it must be preferred.
iii. Transaction Costs Associated with Conditions
"Running with the Good" 3
Permitting post-sale patent enforcement of restraints on
use or resale creates uncertainty and risk for subsequent
acquirers. Contract enforcement requires privity, a
requirement that turns on a party's knowledge and
acceptance of the limitation. Patent rights operate "against
the world"-permitting enforcement without notice or an
agreement to be bound. Consequently, if violating a
restriction on post-sale use or resale constitutes patent
infringement, liability attaches to anyone exceeding its scope.
The possibility that a limitation exists somewhere in the
chain of title will therefore require spending time and money
on inquiry and contractual self-help (such as terms and
remedies providing practical protection against such claims)
in every transaction involving a potentially patented article.
Avoiding those transaction costs may justify a per se
exhaustion rule.
183. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 23-27; see Van Houweling, supra note
165, at 893-900, 914-21. Beyond the basic downstream identification concern
discussed in the following text, synergistic effects can arise from the anti-
commons fragmentation of ownership rights and the resulting need to locate
multiple parties whose consent may be required for use or acquisition by
downstream uses. See Robinson, supra note 165, at 1492-93; see Van
Houweling, supra note 165, at 902-03. The anti-commons information issues
raise the same cost concerns as, and are covered by, the discussion immediately
below in the text. The separate synergistic adverse anti-commons effects on
competition and innovation are discussed infra notes 204-20 and accompanying
text.
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The problem of unknown upstream limitations is not
unique to the patent exhaustion inquiry. Restrictions on the
use and resale of land raise a similar dilemma and pose the
same efficiency conflict-the desire to maximize transactional
flexibility through highly reliable "property rules"
enforcement of limitations without creating the substantial
transaction costs associated with uncertainty risk. The real
property problem was resolved by creating statutory title
record systems, and the related concepts of actual,
constructive, and inquiry notice. 184 That approach produced a
sufficiently reliable and inexpensive means for creating and
confirming title restrictions to justify allowing conditions to
"run with the land"-that is, to permit enforcement against
all subsequent owners with legally adequate notice, requiring
their compliance with the restrictions in accordance with
their terms.
The law has been more circumspect about permitting
"servitudes" on personal property interests.18 1 It has not,
however, imposed a blanket ban. Instead, to permit
transactional flexibility, it has used tailored solutions to
address the transaction cost problem. Two examples
highlight that point. First, when the social benefits of
fostering the type of transaction justifies the expense,
personal property law has adopted a modified version of the
real property record-notice system. In particular, to
encourage financing transactions using goods as collateral,
title systems were created to track automobile, boat, and
airplane ownership and related liens,1 6 and a filing system
under U.C.C. Article 9 permits perfecting priority security
interests in a wide range of personal property.18 7 Second, the
doctrine of superior relative title permits assertion of "better"
prior ownership rights in all kinds of personalty by lessors,
bailors, and under the law of finders.18 8
A similar cost mitigation approach provides a more
efficient response to post-sale patent enforcement risks than
184. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 27; see Van Houweling, supra note
165, at 896-900; see also R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, JEROME M. ORGAN & ALICE
M. NOBLE-ALLGIRE, PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 734-54 (3d ed. 2004).
185. See Van Houweling, supra note 165, at 907-24.
186. See FREYERMUTH ET AL., supra note 184, at 146 n.1.
187. U.C.C. art. 9 (2007).
188. See FREYERMUTH ET AL., supra note 184, at 130-45; see Robinson, supra
note 165, at 1508.
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a per se exhaustion rule. Because those risks can affect
virtually any transaction, the large numbers and relatively
low values make a recordkeeping solution prohibitively
expensive. The solution lies in the underlying goal of such
systems, ensuring purchasers have a reasonable opportunity
to protect their interests. Adapting the real property notice
triumvirate to the personal property context provides the
necessary mechanism. Lack of records eliminates
constructive notice, leaving actual and inquiry notice. To
preserve a claim for patent infringement, the patent owner
would have to demonstrate that the downstream defendant
either was aware of the patent and the restriction or had
sufficient information to trigger a reasonable concern, and
that the resulting investigation would reveal the post-sale
patent enforcement right. Uncertainty costs could be further
reduced by requiring patent owners to take reasonable steps
to affirmatively inform the market of their rights. For
example, in appropriate cases they might be required to
attach notice to the good, or to impose contractual down-
stream disclosure requirements on initial purchasers.
The notice approach does not eliminate the uncertainty
and risk transaction costs of post-sale patent enforcement; it
merely reduces them. But it does so substantially. Patent
owners will bear the costs of providing adequate notice, but
will have full control over that investment, allowing them to
match it to the resulting benefits. 1 Inquiry and contractual
self-help costs would be limited to acquirers with notice,
eliminating virtually all such costs in most transactions. In
the remaining situations, the acquirer will have already
received much, if not all, of the essential information from
other sources. Comparing these minimal transaction costs to
the transactional flexibility and incentive benefits of
permitting post-sale patent enforcement, the notice approach
seems a far more efficient solution than per se exhaustion.
iv. Allocative Inefficiency Concernsl90
Post-sale patent enforcement of restrictions raises two
potential allocative efficiency problems."' The first is the
189. There will, of course, also be enforcement battles regarding the
adequacy of notice.
190. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 34-37; see Robinson, supra note 165,
at 1489-90; see Van Houweling, supra note 165, at 900-02, 921.
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adverse effect on dynamic market reallocation of resources in
response to change. The second involves the waste caused
when restrictions trigger disposal of patented articles prior to
the end of their useful life.
The paradigmatic example of the dynamic reallocation
problem is the real property "residential only" restriction.
Injunctive enforcement substantially reduces the seller's risk
that a breach will negatively affect its interests. That
increased reliability encourages conditional transactions,
increasing access to and maximizing present use of the land.
But when circumstances change, as when the area changes
into an industrial zone, the same restriction prohibits the
burdened property from moving to a more appropriate and
higher value use.
As with transaction costs, real property law adopted a
cost-mitigation approach to maximize the net outcome.
Rather than prohibiting injunctive enforcement of all
restrictions, and foregoing the related transaction flexibility
benefits, it reduced the likely harm. That was accomplished
by combining an outside limit on a restriction's duration,
addressing the fact that after an extended period of time the
benefits will dissipate leaving only the costs, 19 2 with an
"abandonment/changed circumstances" doctrine, allowing for
interim challenges should a limitation cease to provide value
at an earlier time. 9 3
Patent enforcement of restrictions on patented articles
arguably can have the same effects, i.e., initially encouraging
productive transactional flexibility, but disrupting future
dynamic reallocation in response to changing circumstances.
A per se exhaustion rule would reduce the possibility of
future allocative harm, but would provide less encouragement
to the original transaction. The question is whether a better
net solution exists.
191. The possible harms to competition and innovation from underuse of
intellectual property resources are addressed infra notes 204-20 and
accompanying text.
192. The now-infamous Rule Against Perpetuities has been largely replaced
by (generally) more straight-forward statutory time limitations. See
FREYERMUTH ET AL., supra note 184, at 321-24; see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY 336-38 (3d ed. 2009).
193. FREYERMUTH ET AL., supra note 184, at 645-57; see SINGER, supra note
192, at 231-32, 288-90.
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Two differences between patented articles and real
property make the dynamic allocation problem less
problematic. First, most patented articles do not change in
application in response to new circumstances. They are
constructed for a specific purpose and their nature makes it
difficult to adapt them to other uses. Second, they generally
have relatively short useful lives and low absolute value.194
Together these facts substantially reduce the concern that
changed circumstances will trap a worrisome aggregate value
of patented articles in unproductive use for a problematic
period of time.
In the unlikely event such problems do exist, the real
property approach again provides a better net efficiency
response than per se exhaustion. The twenty-year patent
term'9 establishes a relatively short and easily applied
maximum limitation on post-sale patent enforcement.19 6 The
passage of time will constantly reduce the patent term and
with it the maximum duration of post-sale limitations
imposed on newly sold articles. In actuality, short useful
lives mean most conditions will last only for substantially
shorter periods. If some significant problem should surface, it
can be addressed by implementing a variation on the
"changed circumstances" doctrine.
The related problem of waste arises from the same
characteristics of patented articles that all but eliminate the
dynamic allocation efficiency concern. When owners have no
further use for a patented article they will consider how to
dispose of it. The logical solution is to sell the article to
194. See Robinson, supra note 165, at 1489; see Van Houweling, supra note
165, at 921. A dynamic allocation problem can arise from the inability to shift
to a more productive use in response to changed circumstances under "field of
use" limitations-for example a restriction permitting only private (rather than
commercial) use. The problem would only be severe, however, if a substantial
amount of resources remained trapped for a significant period of time. That
outcome is highly unlikely given the relatively short useful lives of most
personal property and the greater possibility for negotiating a release of the
restriction against payment of a reasonable price (the restriction normally is
imposed for purely financial return reasons, to prevent the buyer from obtaining
value not included in the original, reduced price, not to protect another
investments or prevent externalities). The more likely problem is "waste," an
issue discussed immediately following the dynamic allocation discussion in the
text.
195. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
196. Thus avoiding the original Rule Against Perpetuities debacle. See supra
note 192.
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another user, obtaining value for and permitting capture of
its remaining useful life. Post-sale patent enforcement of
restrictions can decrease the chances of that occurring,
producing inefficient non-use, frequently in the form of
outright disposal. The problem goes well beyond restrictions
that prevent resale. Field of use or resale price requirements
make it more difficult to locate qualified and willing
purchasers. Because patented articles have relatively low
values and short useful lives, there is little incentive to take
steps to overcome the restriction through renegotiation,
challenge, or breach. As the incorporated physical resources
may be insubstantial, the option of recycling them to another
use is also likely unattractive. These factors combine to make
deposit in the trash bin the frequent outcome.
The high probability of early disposal raises two concerns
that might justify a per se exhaustion rule: Direct waste from
the failure to recycle the physical resources incorporated in
the article, and the loss of the article's remaining useful life.
Regarding direct waste, Professor Hovenkamp makes the
valid point that the problem is mitigated by its self-regulating
nature.197 A patent owner imposing a restriction leading to
early physical disposal must pay to acquire the incorporated
materials. Even when those costs can be passed on to
consumers, patent owners will seek to maximize their profit
margins by avoiding duplicative manufacture, either by
permitting additional use for further consideration or by
recovering useable materials (or articles) whenever
economically feasible.'
The real difficulty with relying on direct waste to justify
per se exhaustion is that prohibiting post-sale patent
enforcement does little to solve the problem. The absence of
patent remedies only marginally increases the likelihood of
continued use of the article until the end of the article's useful
life; contractual enforcement will generally suffice. And, in
all events, at life-end the direct waste problem still remains.
If it is a significant concern, direct waste would be far more
effectively and efficiently addressed by an environmental law
mandating recycling.
197. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 36.
198. In fact many companies, such as ink cartridge manufacturers, have
return programs designed to facilitate direct recycling.
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The second waste concern focuses on the loss of
remaining useful life when a post-sale condition triggers early
disposal.1' For example, when a supplier imposes a single
use restriction on printer ink cartridges, the limitation will
prevent the refilling and reuse of an existing article that can
still fulfill its purpose. When it is disposed of, the value of
that use is destroyed."o
Although the problem is real, it does not justify
eliminating post-sale patent enforcement in all cases. Even
on its own terms, exhaustion does not fully address the
problem. The doctrine prevents reconditioning.2 0 1  For
articles considered at the end of their useful life based on
partial consumption, such as the ink cartridge, exhaustion
will not prevent the loss of their considerable remaining
value. For others, the savings from rebuilding over new
manufacture will be lost. More importantly, as with direct
waste, contract enforcement of post-sale restrictions causes
the more significant harm. That regime constrains transfer
by the initial purchaser, thus causing the maximum loss of
remaining useful life.202 If lost useful life were sufficient to
support legal intervention, the law should prohibit all
enforcement of post-sale restrictions.
The same reasons the law does not impose such a blanket
prohibition also make per se exhaustion an inappropriate
solution. Some post-sale conditions only minimally constrain
use to the end of useful life. For example, any restriction
permitting resale to a limited but large group of potential
buyers makes conveyance straight-forward. Prohibiting
enforcement on lost useful life grounds in such cases would
unnecessarily interfere with beneficial transactional
flexibility (and in the case of exhaustion, patent incentives).
But even when a condition substantially interferes with full
capture of an article's useful life, the resulting waste cannot
199. See Van Houweling, supra note 165, at 940-41.
200. Recycling mitigates, but does not resolve, the lost useful life concern.
Although the resources can be put back into productive use, any remaining
value to be derived from the initial manufacturing and distribution investment
will disappear.
201. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text; see also Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (1992).
202. The absence of more powerful patent law remedies may mitigate the
issue somewhat by encouraging efficient breach. The point is discussed infra at
note 238 and accompanying text.
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justify prohibition standing alone. The resulting loss of
useful life may be necessary to obtain other gains producing a
net overall improvement in efficient market operation. For
example, in some instances such restrictions may avoid
serious safety or quality problems.2 0 3  In others they will
facilitate quid pro quo price reductions that increase overall
access and use.
Any prophylactic prohibition on enforcement will,
therefore, considerably overshoot the mark. The overreaction
possibility is particularly applicable in the per se exhaustion
context. As post-sale patent enforcement only marginally
increases the possibility of lost useful life, the resulting
elimination of transactional flexibility and increased patent
incentives makes a net negative outcome very likely. The net
efficiency improvement metric requires a more targeted
approach-one that reliably distinguishes between net
positive and net negative outcomes on the specific facts. The
answer is found in the approach to the same line-drawing
requirement raised by the next topic on the justification
agenda: the competitive harms caused by post-sale
restrictions on use or resale.
v. Harms to Competition"o4
Many post-sale conditions interfere with the robust
competition essential to market efficiency. Geographic
limitations, restrictions on field of use, and sourcing
restrictions, such as tying and exclusive dealing or resale
price/terms constraints, can increase prices and reduce output
by constraining existing competitors and prohibiting new
entry by foreclosing access to markets and required resources.
Although the concerns are real, and post-sale patent
enforcement would increase the effect of such restrictions, the
problem does not justify a per se exhaustion rule.
As with lost useful life, not all post-sale conditions
restricting competition produce net inefficient outcomes. The
need to distinguish between net beneficial and net harmful
conditions led to the Rule of Reason assessment that guides
application of contemporary antitrust law.2 05 The Rule of
203. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 36-37.
204. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 8; see also Robinson, supra note
165, at 1494-1516; see also Van Houweling, supra note 165, at 921-23.
205. See Chiappetta, supra note 84, at 10-11, 36-37.
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Reason inquiry recognizes an important real world fact:
although every restriction impairs competition and efficient
market operation to some extent, that harm is justified when
necessary to obtain a net overall improvement.
Consequently, blanket prohibition of all restrictions must
yield to individual assessment of net effects on market
performance under the specific circumstances.
The evolution of antitrust vertical restraint
jurisprudence-the form of restriction imposed by patent
owners on purchasers of patented articles-eloquently makes
the point. The Court started from much the same place as
per se exhaustion. It held that the resulting interference
with competition justified a per se ban on virtually every
post-sale restriction, including those fixing minimum resale
prices,206 maximum resale prices,207 as well as those imposing
geographic and other market resale limitations.2 0 8 One by
one, each of those per se rules has been replaced by the Rule
of Reason assessment. 209  The rationale was the same in
every case: Although such post-sale restrictions constrain
competition, they can also improve efficient market
performance overall. As a result, before finding a condition
unenforceable, it is necessary to inquire into its actual effects
in the specific circumstances.
It might be argued that exhaustion fills a gap left by
antitrust law's focus on market power. 210 Antitrust law does
permit post-sale restrictions when the seller controls only a
small portion of the market, a situation likely to exist
regarding many patented articles. In fact, in vertical
restraint cases, the presence of significant interbrand
competition frequently serves as the primary justification for
206. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(the Court justifies the antitrust prohibition, in part, on restraint of trade
grounds).
207. See Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
208. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
209. The per se ban on market divisions in Schwinn was overruled in Cont'l
T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); the Albrecht per se ban on maximum
retail price maintenance was overruled in State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997);
and the Dr. Miles per se ban on minimum retail price maintenance was
overruled in Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007).
210. The market power gap argument is one of the primary justifications for
the doctrine of patent misuse. It fares no better than the exhaustion version for
the reasons discussed in the text. See Chiappetta, supra note 84, at 32-39.
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permitting the supplier to control intrabrand competition by
constraining post-sale use and resale of its products.2 1 ' But
treating that apparent insouciance as an antitrust law gap
misses the point. Absent sufficient market power,
competition effectively constrains over-reaching. As Judge
Posner pointed out when objecting to the Court's then-still-
existing per se ban on maximum retail price maintenance in
Khan v. State Oil Co.,212 when the supplier imposing such a
post-sale restriction lacks market power, resellers will simply
move to alternatives if it "squeezes their margins below a
competitive level."2 13 As the market can prevent net harms in
such cases, legal intervention would only interfere with net
positive arrangements as demonstrated by market demand.
Antitrust Rule of Reason analysis is the superior
approach to competitive harm caused by post-sale
restrictions. Proper assessment of market effects will take
into account the consequences (positive and negative) of post-
sale patent enforcement, including the increased effectiveness
of the restraint.2 14 Any restriction causing net harm will be
entirely unenforceable, whether through a patent
infringement action or otherwise. The competitive
interference produced by enforcing all other restrictions will
be justified based on the arrangement's overall net efficiency
improvement.215 A per se exhaustion rule would interfere
with that desirable outcome by eliminating the related
transactional flexibility, as well as unjustifiably eliminate the
211. See Cont'1 T.V., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19 (1977) ("[Wlhen interbrand
competition exists . . . it provides a significant check on the exploitation of
intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a
different brand of the same product."). Vertical transactions involving end-
users will receive yet more relaxed scrutiny as they constitute the basic engine
of the market economy. See Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137
(1998). But again, a failure to sanction reflects a finding that under the
circumstances such transactions produce more net benefit than harm. See id.
(rejecting application of a per se rule).
212. 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996).
213. See id. at 1362.
214. Current antitrust doctrine undoubtedly fails to properly make the
proper Rule of Reason net determination in many instances. That shortcoming,
however, calls for recalibrating the regime's implementing doctrine, not
imposing a blanket prohibition sweeping in even desirable conditional
transactions. See Chiappetta, supra note 84, at 39-41.
215. Default exhaustion will apply to prevent patent law's inherent
restrictions from barring all use or sale by the purchaser. See supra notes 159
and 168.
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increased incentives produced by post-sale patent
enforcement.216
vi. Harms to Innovation
Commentators frequently address the potential adverse
effects of post-sale limitations on innovation as a distinct
issue.217 Such harms can arise in a variety of ways-
restrictions can decrease access to development tools or other
necessary resources, prohibit independent development, or
foreclose essential markets.2 18 Although a real concern,
constraints on innovation should be understood and
addressed as a form of "competitive" harm.219 Any restriction
adversely affecting innovation will trigger antitrust concern
and a Rule of Reason assessment. Failure to impose antitrust
sanctions will reflect a determination that the harm to
innovation is necessary to produce a net increase in efficient
market operation.2 20 Imposing a blanket exhaustion
prohibition on post-sale patent enforcement would again
inappropriately interfere with desirable transactions, and
would unjustifiably eliminate the benefits of post-sale patent
enforcement.
216. These additional benefits and their related costs of patent enforcement
should be part of the Rule of Reason inquiry. The possibility that limiting
enforcement of otherwise net efficient restrictions to contract law produces a
better net efficiency outcome is discussed infra at notes 223-42 and
accompanying text.
217. As patent law exists expressly to foster innovation, there is merit to
ensuring its powerful exclusionary rights do not themselves inappropriately
impair inventive behavior. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 43-44 (raising the
issue only to dismiss it quickly); see Robinson, supra note 165, at 1492-93. The
same patent policy argument has been made in support of patent misuse and
can be dismissed for the same reasons as discussed in the text. See Chiappetta,
supra note 84, at 48-55. The related more general argument that exhaustion
provides a necessary inherent limitation on patent rights to ensure optimal
incentives is discussed in the next section.
218. See Chiappetta, supra note 84, at 48-49.
219. See id. at 49-50.
220. See id. at 50-55. The argument that antitrust law may be too
insensitive to incipient harms, particularly when an emerging technology is
involved, has some merit. That problem calls for improving antitrust Rule of
Reason analysis, however, and not a blanket interference with all transactions.
See id.
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vii Exhaustion as an Inherent Limitation on Patent
Rights
The above discussion demonstrates that although post-
sale limitations on use or resale can adversely affect the
assumptions essential to efficient market operation, legal
interventions tailored to mitigate the specific harms they can
cause provide a better net efficient solution than per se
exhaustion. That conclusion, however, does not fully resolve
the inquiry. It fails to consider that exhaustion only prevents
post-sale patent enforcement of restrictions on use and resale.
That leaves the possibility that limiting enforcement of
otherwise net positive restrictions to contract law in all
circumstances might produce an even better net outcome than
treating exhaustion as a waivable default, thus justifying a
per se exhaustion rule.
Answering that question requires examining how the
contract-only approach would affect the benefits and costs.
The case that the approach produces the more efficient
outcome is straight-forward. Eliminating patent law's in rem,
injunctive enforcement reduces the reach of post-sale
restrictions on use and resale. That will, in turn, improve (or
create) the secondary aftermarket, reducing prices, increasing
access, and limiting deadweight loss. Some empirical
evidence supports this argument, showing that when
intellectual property rights cannot be used to segment
markets and price discriminate, consumer welfare
increases.2 2 1  This improvement in consumer welfare may
justify per se exhaustion as an inherent limitation on patent
rights,2 22 functioning to eliminate unmerited harms from the
right to exclude.
Determining whether the "inherent limitation" argument
has merit requires looking first at how it fits with current
221. See Rahul Telang, Associate Professor of Information Technology and
Management, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, Panel Discussion at
the Santa Clara University School of Law High Tech Law Institute Symposium:
Exhaustion and First Sale in IP (Nov. 5, 2010).
222. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 162, at 31-32. The limitation only
involves the potential leveraging effects of exercising the right to exclude and
must be distinguished from rectifying problems related to the requirements
governing patentability (proper subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness and the
like). Undue costs from improper implementation of those requirements should
be addressed by their recalibration, not limitations on the exploitation of the
resulting patents. See Chiappetta, supra note 84, at 13-14, 31.
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patent policy. The patent regime exists to overcome free-
riding distortion of investment in innovation.223 It creates
countervailing incentives by giving investor/inventors the
legal right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
their innovations. That legal right permits the capture of
related market demand. The regime's in rem enforcement
and powerful "property rule" remedies play a central role in
translating that theory into reality. This remedial approach
ensures control "in fact" by reaching all competitive adoption,
by deploying "property rule" injunctive relief to eliminate the
trespass and by imposing enhanced damages to deter
infringements in the first instance. The resulting actual
control allows patent owners to maximize their individual
return by adjusting output and price to the full extent of their
patent "monopoly."2 24  Those adjustments create surplus
returns from consumer wealth transfers, as well as
deadweight loss, that, in turn, generate the incentive to
invest.
Because the regime operates by reducing consumer
welfare, justifying a per se exhaustion rule based solely on
such improvements is a non-starter. In fact, the same studies
demonstrating increases in consumer welfare find,
unsurprisingly, that it comes at the expense of the
intellectual property owner.225 Patent law, however, is
subject to the core efficiency tenet that any legal intervention
must not only produce a net increase in efficient market
operation but the optimal outcome. That requires patent law
incentive benefits not only be calibrated based on the
associated costs, but that the regime also produce the
maximally efficient result.
The question, therefore, is whether contract-only
enforcement of post-sale restrictions on use or resale
improves the patent incentive versus cost net outcome. As
laws of general application prevent all enforcement, patent or
223. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
224. The "monopoly" only references control over the claimed invention.
Actual returns will be affected by competitive alternatives. See Ill. Tool Works,
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). The "take and pay" liability rules
alternative suffers from two significant defects. First, it moves the regime away
from producing incentives that reflect actual market demand. Second, it
triggers the considerable difficulties, uncertainties, and administrative costs of
judicial determination of appropriate value.
225. See supra note 221.
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contract, of otherwise net inefficient post-sale restrictions on
use or resale, any net outcome improvement from contract-
only enforcement must arise in the context of otherwise net
positive restrictions.226 Patent enforcement of such
restrictions encourages their use, as well as increases patent
owner returns and resulting incentives. But it also reduces
consumer welfare by permitting more effective market
segmentation and price discrimination. The key question,
therefore, is whether contract-only enforcement produces a
sufficient improvement in consumer welfare so as to offset the
transactional flexibility, and the returns and related
incentives lost by prohibiting all post-sale patent
infringement actions. If so, per se exhaustion would be
justified as an inherent patent law limitation ensuring that
the regime's exclusionary rights only produce optimally
efficient incentives.
a. An Aside on Licenses to Manufacture and
Distribute
The optimally efficient incentives requirement justifies
the current inapplicability of the exhaustion doctrine to
licenses to make and sell.2 27 Such licensing allows patent
owners to leverage third party manufacturing capacity and
expertise, as well as their related distribution advantages.
Reliable enforcement of such limitations permits patent
owners to more efficiently create patented articles, increasing
output and lowering price. Eliminating reliable patent law
enforcement would make such licensing much riskier for both
the patent owner and the manufacturer. Contract-only
enforcement would provide damages but severely impair, if
not eliminate, patent owners' actual control over output
levels, as well as their ability to insulate the licensee from
intrabrand competition.2 28 The resulting decrease in skills
and resource leveraging would impede desirable patent
226. The default exhaustion position eliminates the inherent, non-
contractual patent law restrictions on use and resale. See supra note 159.
227. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. It merits note that the
downstream transaction cost concern applies with equal force to sales of both
authorized and unauthorized articles. That fact supports the argument in favor
of imposing adequate "notice" requirements on all post-sale patent enforcement,
including those based on the breach of a manufacturing license. See supra notes
185-89 and accompanying text.
228. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 30.
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exploitation while reducing efficient market operation and
consumer welfare.229
b. Sales of Patented Articles
Enforcement of post-sale conditions on existing patent
articles raises different issues and concerns. The Court's
"single royalty" rationale provides the appropriate starting
point for that inquiry. 23 0 This rationale reflects the intuitive
and logical notion that a patent owner receiving the market
value of a patented article in an arms-length sale has
obtained the full incentive due under the patent right.
Permitting post-sale patent enforcement would give the
patent owner inappropriate down-stream leverage,
permitting the extraction of surplus consideration. Because
those returns exceed the innovation's market value, they
cause unjustified consumer harm, producing surplus (more
than optimum) incentives to invest.
The argument does not withstand scrutiny.231  Although
a patent can produce a non-competitive surplus return, that
return reflects the market-demand incentive contemplated by
the right to exclude. The possibility that post-sale patent
enforcement increases that surplus by permitting down-
stream "multi-charging" can be dismissed on the same basis
as the discredited monopoly leveraging argument applied to
tying. The unconstrained purchase price will include the
returns from subsequent resale to others. Patent owner
attempts to capture that value through restrictions on resale
will result in an off-setting reduction 23 2 in the price the buyer
is willing to pay. Whether collected from the initial
purchaser, or from a series of subsequent down-stream
purchasers, the aggregate return will be the same. Post-sale
229. Patent owners would engage in inefficient self-help (pursuing and
terminating violators), and would limit their licensing activity both to those
they trusted (who might not be the most efficient producers) and in aggregate.
Potential licensees would be harder to convince, requiring assurances in the
form of guarantees and other undertakings by the patent owner.
230. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
231. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 21-23.
232. The actual amount will be discounted to reflect present value and risk.
The accuracy of these adjustments, of course, assumes that the remaining
efficiency assumptions are operational, including the availability of adequate
information, the ability to process it, and the capacity to act as an economically
efficient actor. Ensuring that is the case may require other legal regulation.
See supra note 168 and infra note 243.
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patent enforcement does not produce any incremental harm,
while less reliable contract-only enforcement presses patent
owners to extract the full amount on the first sale. By
unnecessarily constraining transactional flexibility, the
contract-only approach would produce a net decrease in
efficiency, and not an improvement.
The possibility that contract-only post-sale enforcement
may eliminate excess returns and non-optimal incentives
from other sources requires a more detailed inquiry.
Whenever a post-sale restriction on use or resale exists, the
buyer will insist on a related reduction in the purchase price
to account for the limitation. Although, for the reasons
explained above, patent enforcement of such restrictions does
not permit patent owners to capture surplus returns from
down-stream transactions related to the specific article, it can
nonetheless increase patent owners' aggregate returns from
all sales by permitting effective price discrimination.23 3
For example, a negotiated post-sale restriction may limit
the field of use, impose a floor on resale price, or prohibit
resale entirely. Initial buyers will insist that the price they
pay reflects only the value they receive, and so they will pay
less for specific articles subject to such limitations. By
reducing the initial price, the patent owner only receives the
value attributable to the rights conveyed in that particular
transaction. But the condition also reduces secondary market
competition with initial sales. That increases the patent
owner's ability to set and maintain separate prices reflecting
distinct market demands, thus increasing wealth transfers
from higher-value users. Because buyers are generally
indifferent to these effects on other purchasers (they have
only paid for the value they received and may, in fact, prefer
higher prices be paid by others) the patent owner will receive
the entire amount of those extra returns. Therefore, the
patent owner will increase its overall returns whenever its
price discrimination gains exceed the reductions in price on
conditional sales.
Increased patent owner returns from price discrimination
based on more reliable post-sale patent enforcement
enhances the patent incentive. But that increased incentive
233. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 37-39; see Robinson, supra note 165,
at 1506-07.
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is only justified if it produces the optimal net overall
efficiency outcome in light of the decrease in consumer
welfare. Although it is impossible to precisely measure the
incremental increase in efficiency from post-sale patent
enforcement in transactional flexibility (increased output
through reliable enforcement of restrictions permitting
additional sales) or increased investment in innovation from
the prospect of additional returns from price discrimination,
it is reasonable to assume some exists. It is equally
reasonable to assume that the less certain control afforded by
contract-only enforcement will constrain transactional
flexibility, and will reduce patent owner returns. Therefore,
the key question is whether the contract-only approach can
reduce the adverse consumer welfare effects of price
discrimination while maintaining sufficient overall output to
produce a superior net efficiency outcome.
Although definitive empirical evidence is lacking, 23 4 a
review of the relevant considerations makes a superior net
outcome from contract-only enforcement extremely
unlikely.3 Two initial points substantially narrow the
prospects. Most importantly, antitrust law will prohibit all
enforcement of post-sale vertical restrictions when
competition does not effectively constrain intrabrand market
segmentation/price discrimination.236 Consequently, the
improvement must come from reducing consumer welfare
harms and maintaining output when alternative offerings
already significantly limit the patent owner's ability to price
discriminate. Second, the tangible nature of patented articles
significantly reduces the ability of even a vibrant secondary
234. Professor Telang's studies focus on the effects of exhaustion regarding
sales of intangible copyrighted articles (eBooks). As he noted, these effects
cannot be directly applied to the patented articles inquiry. See supra note 221.
As Professor Ochoa wryly, but accurately, noted at the conference, that is the
situation in most intellectual property debates It is not unusual to have
sufficient empirical evidence to convince ourselves but not others of the merit of
our position. Tyler Ochoa, Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of
Law, Panel Discussion at the Santa Clara University School of Law High Tech
Law Institute Symposium: Exhaustion and First Sale in IP (Nov. 5, 2010).
235. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 41-42; see Robinson, supra note 165,
at 1505-08.
236. See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text. The argument that
owning the patent, by itself, provides sufficient power to trigger concern was
eliminated by the Court in Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006).
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market to constrain the price of new goods. Time and use
degrades and obsoletes such articles,2 37 so used articles will
have only a very limited effect on patent owner sales.
Moreover, even if exhaustion applies, the doctrine's bar to
reconstruction will limit reconditioning, and to the extent
refurbishing is permitted, it will increase secondary market
prices, reducing used article competitiveness.
That said, the fact that patent owners desire to preserve
infringement claims provides a sufficiently credible argument
that enforcement of post-sale conditions provides enough of a
supplemental return, and an associated decrease in consumer
welfare, to merit further inquiry. Determining the likely
effect of a contract-only enforcement approach on consumer
welfare and output must start from the fact that it would only
mitigate, not prevent, price discrimination. The strong
normative bias to comply with agreed contract restrictions
will lead many, and likely the vast majority, of initial and
subsequent purchasers to honor the limitation. In such cases,
as the patented article will never escape the constraint, no
improvement can occur. That means contract-only
enforcement would produce some net decrease in efficiency by
eliminating some conditional transactions without obtaining
any related benefit.
Instances of purchaser breach may nonetheless be
substantial enough to create a viable secondary market.
Eliminating the more powerful patent remedies may increase
that likelihood by changing the risk calculus for both the
reseller and potential acquirers. Initial reseller liability will
be limited to contract expectation damages (reflecting
contract law's encouragement of efficient breach) and, for
regular purchasers from the patent owner, perhaps
termination of their future supply. For down-stream sellers
and all potential buyers, the absence of contractual privity
with the patent owner would significantly limit their
exposure, requiring the patent owner to rely on such
notoriously difficult claims as tortious interference with
contract.238
237. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing the relatively
short useful life of patentable articles).
238. It bears mention that most downstream sellers and buyers will be
unaware of the limitation, meaning the notice requirements predicate to
enforcement (justified on other grounds) would exempt them from post-sale
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But that is not the end of the matter. If sufficient
leakage occurs, patent owners will respond. At a minimum,
they will increase the pressure to comply by emphasizing
their reasonable expectation of adherence to negotiated
conditions (particularly when they reflect a quid pro quo
reduction in price), and the legal and practical risks of failing
to do so. They will also take steps to make the requirement
and related breach more apparent to potential purchasers.
This can be accomplished, for example, by permanently
affixing notice to the articles themselves. Higher risk
customers, particularly distributors and other volume buyers,
may be subjected to enhanced record keeping and tracking
requirements, more frequent and unscheduled inspections,
and renewal standards that take into account arbitrage
concerns. Barriers to effective enforcement, 239 and any
encouragement to breach they may provide, will be addressed
by market-watch and investigatory programs designed to
identify sources and aggressive pursuit of violators, including,
perhaps most effectively, terminating problematic supply
arrangements.
If the problem becomes substantial-precisely those
situations likely to produce any significant consumer welfare
increases-patent owners may change their distribution
approach. The most hard pressed may elect to lease rather
than sell the articles and condition all assignments on the
assignee's express assumption of the limitations. 24 0 But in all
events, patent owners will react the way every producer does
to legal interference with price discrimination-by increasing
initial sales prices to account for reduced returns from
unchecked arbitrage.
These patent owner responses to contract-only
enforcement make an improved efficiency outcome highly
unlikely. The self-help expenditures and direct increases in
price will increase the cost of initial acquisition and
authorized resale (both price and the overhead of compliance
requirements). Combined with the increased patent owner
patent infringement claims in all events. See supra notes 188-89 and
accompanying text.
239. Inability to use post-sale patent enforcement against the current
owner/user makes it necessary in most cases to indentify the original purchaser
supplying in breach of contract. Cf Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 42.
240. See Robinson, supra note 165, at 1507.
2011] 1143
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
reluctance to enter into riskier conditional sales in the first
instance, the contract-only enforcement approach is more
likely to result in fewer articles sold at higher prices,
decreasing both efficiency and consumer welfare, perhaps
substantially.241
The absence of consumer welfare gains (to say nothing of
the possible decrease) and reductions in output powerfully
undermine the argument that the contract-only approach
provides a superior net efficiency outcome. As the default
exhaustion rule provides enhanced transactional flexibility
and increased incentives with substantially the same, if not
better, consumer welfare and output outcomes, it is the
preferred approach.242
viii The Efficiency Bottom Line
The efficiency paradigm strongly supports using
exhaustion as a default contract term that can be waived by
obtaining the purchaser's express agreement to specific
exceptions. It does not provide any viable argument for a per
se rule prohibiting post-sale patent enforcement in all
circumstances. Rather, the identified efficiency concerns are
better addressed by creating specific limitations that target
and mitigate the particular harms. First, in order to prevent
undue interference with competition and innovation, every
post-sale restriction must comply with other laws of general
application, most particularly antitrust law. Second, to avoid
excessive transaction costs enforcement of otherwise valid
restrictions, post-sale patent enforcement should only be
permitted when the patent owner can demonstrate the
particular defendant had actual or inquiry notice of the
limitation. Finally, although post-sale patent enforcement
241. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 40; see Robinson, supra note 165, at
1508.
242. Professor Hovenkamp raises the interesting point that the default
exhaustion rule permits patent owners to more effectively price discriminate
than other market participants, a competitive inequality that at least
intuitively seems at odds with an efficient marketplace. See Hovenkamp, supra
note 8, at 42. Patent policy provides the answer. Patent law allows patent
owners to more effectively price discriminate by giving them powerful control
over all use and resale of the invention. But that enhanced control is the very
point of granting patents. The policy concern, therefore, is not that patents
create extra power or competitive inequality. The concern is whether the post-
sale exercise of the right produces less than optimum incentives. For the
reasons discussed in the text, it does not.
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under the default approach will permit some degree of price
discrimination and related consumer wealth transfer, the
contract-enforcement-only alternative would likely reduce
overall efficiency and consumer welfare.
B. Non-efficiency Justifications
One additional justification for per se exhaustion remains
to be considered. Although efficiency-driven patent law policy
does not support blanket exhaustion, there is ample reason to
wonder whether the regime should be so single-mindedly
focused on advancing that particular goal. An efficient
market, and consequently a patent regime properly designed
to implement that objective, can only produce "efficient"
outcomes.243 Specifically, resources will only be available to
those who can deliver what the current owner demands in
exchange. That distributional consequence is frequently cited
as a justification for limiting patent rights. Because a patent
legally limits use of the invention, those unable to pay the
owner's going-rate will have no access to the covered articles.
As the regime not only entitles, but encourages, owners to
maximize their individual returns, they will restrict output
and increase price in accordance with the power afforded by
their patent. Consequently, a properly efficient patent law
regime will prohibit some, and probably many, members of
society from obtaining resources they may require.2 44
Per se exhaustion appears to offer a ready solution to
that distributional concern. Prohibiting all post-sale patent
enforcement permits patented articles to move more freely in
the market, making them perhaps more readily available at
lower cost. There are two significant problems with this
argument. First, for the reasons discussed above, those
243. Efficient outcomes will only be produced when the efficient market
theory operates effectively in the real world. If the necessary assumptions are
not satisfied, then the "market" will not generate the desired outcome. In such
cases, it makes no sense to justify any legal intervention, including patent
exhaustion, based on whether it helps foster efficient outcomes. But that
possible shortcoming takes the discussion well beyond justification of
exhaustion into a reconsideration of the economic, legal, and social system as a
whole, an exercise well beyond the scope of this inquiry. Cf. Vincent
Chiappetta, The (Practical) Meaning of Property, 46 WILLAmETTE L. REV. 297,
330 n.155 (2009) (discussing the problems created if the "rational economic
actor assumption" does not apply).
244. The same distribution concern, of course, applies in all property
regimes. See generally id.
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hoping that prohibiting post-sale patent enforcement of
restrictions on use or resale will "improve" distribution by
reducing prices and increasing access will likely discover that
it has the opposite effect in actual operation.24 5 And, even
should it produce some degree of redistribution, other legal
tools may produce (far) superior overall outcomes. For
example, it may be more effective to permit patent law to
produce optimal innovation incentives and then use taxes and
social assistance programs to reallocate the resulting
maximized wealth.
Second, and even more problematic, is that justifying
exhaustion on the grounds that it changes market-based
efficient distributional outcomes directly conflicts with the
current approach to patent law and the policy it is designed to
implement. The recent election, and much of the current
political rhetoric, demonstrates that a substantial portion of
the body politic will likely find such a justification
unconvincing.
That some (or even many) desire to maintain the status
quo does not mean that the discussion should not occur.
Whether more than maximizing aggregate utility is required
for a society to be considered "fair and just" deserves serious
consideration. The difficulty is that debate raises issues well
beyond determining whether exhaustion plays a useful role in
advancing the current goals set for the patent regime. It
implicates the antecedent normative question of what those
goals should be;246 an inquiry that requires revisiting whether
(or at least to what extent) the efficient market model should
continue to serve as the fundamental organizing principle for
our economic interactions and the objective of the related
implementing commercial law.
Exhaustion provides an extremely poor framework for
that important discussion. It raises the wrong issue.
Debating whether the doctrine properly implements patent
law's objectives will only create confusion when the actual
disagreement lies in differing views regarding what a
properly structured regime should produce. It is far more
productive to eliminate the misdirection caused by debating
those normative differences through an implementation proxy
245. See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text.
246. See Chiappetta, supra note 243, at 335-42.
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like exhaustion and instead directly discuss what we believe
constitute desirable patent law outcomes. The increased
transparency will enhance identification and understanding
of the various normative positions, and will improve the
search for how they might be acceptably accommodated, if not
reconciled.
Clearly, any attempt to justify per se exhaustion on non-
efficiency grounds is premature. Until we have agreed that
patent law should produce such outcomes, to what extent and
in what forms, it is impossible to determine whether
prohibiting all post-sale patent enforcement of limitations on
use or resale furthers the regime's goals.
CONCLUSION
The original question posed-what is patent exhaustion
good for?-can now be answered. Although no justification
for a per se exhaustion prohibition on post-sale patent
enforcement exists within the current efficiency paradigm (as
an inherent limitation on patent rights or otherwise), the
doctrine provides substantial value as a default term,
waivable by the parties to specific transactions. Proper
default implementation necessitates specific constraints: All
waivers should be based on express buyer acceptance of post-
sale patent enforcement of specifically identified restrictions.
Even when properly waived, downstream patent enforcement
should only be permitted when the particular defendant has
prior actual or inquiry notice of the patent and the restriction
allegedly breached. Additionally, some adjustments to the
antitrust Rule of Reason inquiry are likely appropriate to
ensure the effects of post-sale patent enforcement receive due
consideration in the net efficiency assessment.
Finally, exhaustion cannot be justified on non-efficiency
policy grounds. In the current paradigm, those arguments
turn the exhaustion debate into an unproductive proxy
framework for arguing over what patent law should produce.
In particular, any effort to position exhaustion as a means for
adjusting the distributional consequences of an efficiency-
driven patent regime should be replaced by direct and
transparent discussion of the actual underlying normative
concern.
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